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ABSTRACT 
 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX IN INDONESIA:  
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE, INCIDENCE, AND THE DISTRIBUTION  
OF INCOME TAX BURDEN 
 
By 
THALYTA ERNANDYA YUWONO 
December, 2008 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
This dissertation estimates the relationship between tax-reporting decision and the change 
in marginal tax rates, relying on taxpayer's responses (standard labor supply response) as well as 
reported behavioral responses (compliance). There are still limited studies on elasticity estimates 
for developing countries. We utilize an applicable theoretical model by using standard labor 
supply model and summarize a tax avoidance model as the base of our elasticity estimation. The 
labor supply theoretical model suggests ambiguity of the labor supply decision and the tax 
avoidance model suggest that the responsiveness of taxpayers in the reporting decision differs 
across income groups. As previously stated, in developing countries, empirical evidence on 
reporting decision is still very limited. For our empirical analysis, we estimate reporting income 
elasticity for microsimulation purposes. We use this elasticity to estimate a dynamic behavior 
microsimulation model. The elasticity result shows that higher-income groups are more 
responsive and lower-income groups are less responsive to changes in tax policy. 
  xi
Our empirical analysis continues with estimating differences in taxpayers’ responses to 
the change in tax policy. We use a modified difference-in-difference model to analyze behavioral 
responses of taxpayers that are highly affected by the change in marginal tax rate compared to 
those who are least affected. The result shows that the treatment group, who experienced larger 
reductions on their marginal tax rate, reported more of their income relative to the control group, 
whose members are least affected by the change in marginal tax rate.  
The last part of our empirical analysis examines the distribution of income tax burden 
across different income groups and examines the government's tax collection from withholding 
income from some proposed scenarios. We proposed several scenarios and estimated the change 
in income tax burden compared to that under current income tax law. We also examine the 
government's revenue loss by calculating the tax differences under current and proposed 
scenarios. The overall microsimulation results suggest that there is a trade-off between 
government revenue loss and the distribution of income tax burden.
 
  1
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Income tax plays an important role in government tax revenue in Indonesia, contributing 
the largest share to total government revenue, as compared to other taxes.1 Revenue from income 
tax includes individual income tax revenue and corporate income tax revenue. The total 
government revenue from income tax in 2006 was IDR 165.6 trillion ($18.4 billion), which 
accounted for 52.6 percent of the total government revenue from tax. In this dissertation, we will 
analyze individual income tax from withholding income. Revenue from Individual Income Tax 
Article 21 (the withholding income tax) in 2006 was the second largest amount of revenue, 
accounting for 18.5 percent of total income tax revenue.2 
Income tax in Indonesia has always been under the authority of central government. 
However, the sharing arrangement between central and sub-national government has changed 
based on law 33/2004, and now sub-national governments are entitled to 20 percent of income 
tax revenue. The central government determined both the tax base and tax rates for individual 
and corporate income tax. To make any changes in the income tax rate, income tax reforms are 
necessary; however, any changes on personal exemptions can be made by government decree. 
Personal exemptions have changed several times since 2000.  
This dissertation explores behavioral responses to the distribution of income tax burden 
under current law and under some proposed scenarios for individual income tax in Indonesia. We 
use the basic labor supply choice model to show the ambiguous choice of hours worked when tax
                                                 
1
 See Appendix A, Table A1. 
 
2
 See Appendix A, Table A2. 
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rates change. Data limitation prevents estimation of a true labor supply response. However, we 
do have data on reported wage income. Changes in reported income as tax rates change will be a 
function of labor supply effects and reporting (compliance) behavior. We use a unique individual 
micro-level dataset of income tax returns to empirically analyze the effect of current and 
proposed tax rates. We analyze the effect of change in taxable income with respect to the change 
in marginal tax rates by using several different methods.  
 Using micro-level data on taxpayers from the Indonesian Directorate General of 
Taxation (DGT), the first empirical part of this dissertation uses a difference-in-difference (DID) 
model to show the behavioral response of taxpayers most affected by the change in tax rate 
relative to taxpayers that are least affected. We calculate the taxable income elasticities from the 
change in taxable income with respect to the change on marginal tax rate. The elasticity results 
are useful to analyze dynamic policy simulation using a microsimulation model utilized for this 
dissertation. We use the microsimulation model for analyzing income tax liability under current 
and proposed law, the distribution of income tax burden across income groups, and the tax 
differences under each proposed scenario. As an addition to the basic labor/leisure choice model, 
we also present a summary of tax avoidance models by Alm and Wallace (2007a) that describe 
the theoretical model of taxpayer reporting decisions subject to a change in marginal tax rate.  
 
Background 
This dissertation provides a theoretical framework for the bases of the empirical analysis. 
The microsimulation presented in this dissertation extends the static model of microsimulation 
into a more dynamic behavior model that includes income behavioral responses of taxpayers 
after the change in marginal tax rate in 2000. The microsimulation process in this dissertation is 
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what we might call a “dynamic behavior” microsimulation.3 We do not have a panel dataset to 
generate a dynamic microsimulation of the same individual over time. 
Previous studies on individual income tax reform, the distribution of income tax burden, 
and the behavioral response of taxpayers have used micro-level data from the taxpayer office 
and/or the IRS.4 The main empirical analysis in this dissertation is to develop a dynamic income 
behavior microsimulation that provides policy simulations of income tax reforms. The literature 
on microsimulations for developing countries is still very limited. Previous studies utilizing 
microsimulation models have been done for several countries, such as Russia (McNab and 
Wallace 2000), Czech Republic (Vecernik and Stepankova 2002), Spain (Granell-Perez et al. 
2006), and Jamaica (Alm and Wallace 2007). We believe that there is still limited analysis on the 
individual income tax in Indonesia; the current empirical analysis attempts to fill the gap left by 
previous studies. 
 
Motivation 
The modern tax provision in Indonesia started in1983. This period is the post-1983 
reform period where tax laws are amended and adjusted with current economic conditions. 
Income tax has been simplified, and the rate has been decreased in order to encourage people to 
comply with income-tax reporting rules. In the meantime, the tax authorities are discussing 
several options for the next income tax reform. The income tax law includes individual income 
tax and corporate income tax, both of which utilize a progressive marginal tax rate. There is a 
possibility that the corporate income tax will become a flat rate in the near future, but individual 
                                                 
3
 A fully dynamic model would accommodate changes in the overall level of income, employment, etc. as a result of 
the tax change. 
 
4
 See Chapter II for a detailed literature review. 
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income tax continues to be debated. Policy-makers are debating several options of reform, such 
as whether individual income tax should also be flat with a large level of personal exemption, or 
whether the current progressive marginal tax rate should be changed to a flat rate with an 
increased amount of possible personal exemptions.  
Based on the central government’s plan to reform individual income tax law in the near 
future, this dissertation examines income behavioral response under the current tax law, analyzes 
the distribution of income tax burden, and proposes several options of reform for the individual 
income tax.  
The objectives of this study are: (i) to estimate the relationship between reporting 
decision and the change in marginal tax rate, relying on taxpayer response through the standard 
labor supply response as well as a reporting behavioral response (compliance—we discover that 
there are still limited studies on elasticity estimates for developing countries); (ii) to analyze 
behavioral responses of taxpayers that are highly affected by the change in marginal tax rate 
relative to taxpayers that are least affected; and (iii) to examine the distribution of income tax 
burden across different income groups and examine the government's tax-collection from 
individual income withholdings. 
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II provides a brief 
review of income tax policy in Indonesia, literature review on behavioral response, and literature 
review on microsimulation modeling. In Chapter III we provide a simple theoretical model of 
labor/leisure choice, with the imposition of income tax into the model and a theoretical 
motivation for reporting behavior changes, as well as a basic structure of microsimulation 
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modeling. Chapter IV provides the empirical analysis, including variable description and data 
sources, and the empirical methodology. In Chapter V we present the empirical results on 
behavioral response followed by results on microsimulation. Chapter VI offers a conclusion and 
policy recommendation.
 6 
 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Haig-Simons definition of income is net increase in individual’s ability to consume 
plus additional wealth from any sources. Some economists view this as an optimal definition of 
income for tax purposes. Others consider it overly broad because all sources of income are 
included under individual income. For example, there is no separation between realized and 
unrealized capital gains: income in kind and imputed rent are also considered income according 
to the Haig-Simons measure. Some of the problems arising out of this definition of income 
include difficulties in measuring capital gains and losses, in-kind services, and imputed income 
from durable goods (Rosen 2002). 
The definition of taxable income in Indonesia’s current income tax law is any additional 
income received by the taxpayer, either domestic or international, that can be used to consume 
goods or as additional to the taxpayer’s wealth, including salary, wage, honoraria, bonuses, 
commissions, gratuities, pensions, and business profits. Under Article 21 of the individual 
income tax law, incomes are globally taxed with a progressive tax rate. Under Article 23, the 
definition of profit includes interest, dividends, royalties, rent, insurance premiums, income from 
routine payments, profits from the difference in currency exchange, and additional net wealth 
from income before taxes. Profits are taxed at a constant marginal tax rate of 15 percent. Capital 
gains are taxed at the same progressive rate for individual and corporate income tax and are 
taxed on realized value. There is no difference in rates for short- and long-term capital gains.  
In this chapter, we provide background on the individual income tax in Indonesia and a 
literature review of some findings from previous studies on behavioral responses to tax changes 
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as well as studies on micro simulations across countries. In the first section, we present a brief 
review of the Indonesian income tax policy. The second part of this chapter presents a literature 
review on income tax and the behavioral response of taxpayers to the change in tax rate. The 
next part of this chapter highlights microsimulation analysis across countries, followed by a 
conclusion.  
 
Income Tax Policy in Indonesia 
Regulated by Law No. 17/2000 as the third amendment to Law No. 7/1983, individual 
income tax is still highly centralized. The central government has full authority to determine the 
tax base and tax rate. Indonesia's tax system started with an officer assessment system that 
required tax officers to collect income tax. The modern tax system started in 1983 with the 
adoption of a self-assessment system, which requires taxpayers to fulfill their tax obligations and 
submit tax returns by the end of each tax year.  
Sidik (2007) argued that under the current income tax Law No. 17/2000, self-assessment 
is still maintained as in the former income tax law no 7/1983. Individual taxpayers file their own 
taxes annually except for business owners and independent professionals, in which cases they 
file monthly tax returns. A withholding tax is applied by a third party, such as an employer or 
pension fund, to income sources such as wages and salary, honoraria, pensions, dividends, 
interest, royalties, gifts, rent, and income from Stock Exchange transactions. The withholding tax 
is collected, reported, and paid by the third party that provides the income. Taxpayers are obliged 
to submit their yearly tax reports at most three months after the end of the tax year.5  
                                                 
5
 The due date for submitting tax returns is March 31. The tax year runs from January through December. The main 
income tax return form is SPT 1770S, submitted yearly; an attachment includes a form  1721A1 or 1721A2 for 
employers, which we will use as our data source for the empirical estimation in this dissertation. 
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The tax collection process is managed by an institution designed by the central 
government under the Ministry of Finance: the Directorate General of Taxation (DGT). Under 
the DGT, subordinate organizations responsible for collecting taxes are the Taxpayer Office 
(KPP) and the District Tax Office. The function of KPP is mainly to provide taxpayers with 
services and guides to facilitate submitting their tax returns. Other functions of the KPP include 
administration, collection, and legal issues. Taxpayers submit their tax returns to the KPP office. 
The KPP for Jakarta is available in every sub-district, while in other provinces the KPP is 
available in every district. Since 2001 the DGT has been running a campaign on tax awareness 
and has been enforcing the requirement that each taxpayer have a tax identification number.  
Low compliance and poor administration of the individual income tax have been a 
continuing problem in Indonesia. Low compliance was suspected as the cause of high marginal 
tax rates and low personal exemptions (Directorate General of Taxation 2007). Table A3 in the 
appendix shows several adjustments to the personal exemptions from 1983 through 2006. The 
purpose of these changes is to reduce the income tax burden of lower-income groups. Changes in 
personal exemptions do not necessarily mean that a change has been made in the income tax law, 
which can be done by government regulation, a decree by the Ministry of Finance, or an 
amendment. Under current law, there is an additional exemption for married women filing 
jointly. Married couples with a maximum of three dependents can take additional exemptions. 
Dependents can be children or anyone related by blood, adoption, or marriage and who lives 
with the taxpayer. The same dependents can be claimed only once per taxpayer. If a husband has 
already claimed additional exemptions for being married and having dependents, his spouse can 
exempt only herself. There is also a deductible amount for pension and occupation expenses in 
the amount of 5 percent, which is deducted from the gross income and calculated from the total 
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time of employment in the related year, with a maximum amount of IDR 1,296,000 ($144) 
(Directorate General of Taxation 2007).  
As shown in Table 1, individual income tax rates are divided into five income tax 
brackets per income tax law no. 17/2000, implemented in 2001. Under income tax law no. 
7/1983, there were only three income tax brackets, ranging from 15 percent for taxable income 
up to IDR 10 million ($1,111) to the highest of 35 percent for taxable income higher than IDR 50 
million ($5,556). In 1994 there was an amendment to the income tax law, and in January 1995 
the marginal tax rates changed and now range from 10 percent for taxable income up to IDR 25 
million ($2,778) to 30 percent for taxable income higher than IDR 50 million ($5,556). The 
marginal tax rates for individual income taxes range from 5 percent for people with taxable 
income up to IDR 25 million ($2,778) to 35 percent for people with taxable income above IDR 
200 million ($22,222).6  
Table 1. Statutory Marginal Tax Rate by Income Group, 1983−2000 
Income tax law No. 8/1983 Income tax law No. 10/1994 Income tax law No. 17/2000 
Income group MTR Income group MTR Income group MTR 
<=IDR 10, 000,000 
($2,111) 15% 
<=IDR 25, 000,000 
($2,778) 10% 
<=IDR 25, 000,000 
($2,778) 5% 
>IDR 10,000,000 
($1,111) and <=IDR 
50,000 ($5,556) 
25% 
>IDR 25,000 ($2,778) 
and <=IDR 50,000 
($5,556) 
15% 
>IDR 25,000 ($2,778) 
and <=IDR 50,000 
($5,556) 
10% 
>IDR 50,000 
($5,555.56)  35% >IDR 50,000 ($5,556) 30% 
>IDR 50,000 ($5,556) 
and <=IDR 100,000,000 
($11,111) 
15% 
    
>IDR 100,000,000 
($11,111) and <= IDR 
200,000,000 ($22,222) 
25% 
        
>IDR 200,000,000 
($22,222) 35% 
Source: Rusjdi, 2006 
Note: $1=IDR 9,000 
 
                                                 
6
 The exchange rate that we use in this dissertation is $1=IDR 9,000.  
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Table 1 compares the statutory marginal tax rate (MTR) imposed on individual income in 
nominal terms under previous and current law. The current income tax law introduces a more 
progressive tax rate for individual income tax than the previous law. The lowest income group is 
taxed at a lower rate than under the former law, while the highest income bracket is charged at a 
relatively higher rate. The big disparity between the lowest and the highest tax brackets could 
create an incentive for higher-income earners to try to shift income or otherwise avoid the 
income tax.  
The penalty rate for failing to file taxes or for filing incorrectly is two percent interest per 
month of the unpaid tax calculated from the due date of the tax return. The tax year in Indonesia 
is the same as the calendar year which ends on December. Indonesia adopted a schedular system 
in which unearned income, including dividends, interest, rent, and savings, is taxed at a different 
rate than earned income (15 percent for residents and 20 percent for non-residents). 
There have been many changes in the income tax law since the big tax reform of 1983. 
The post-1983 reform created a simpler tax structure than that of the ordinance period or period 
before 1983 reform. Before 1983, income taxes were divided into four different types: corporate 
tax, individual income tax, wealth tax, and a tax on interest, dividends, and royalties; after 1983, 
those four types of taxes became regulated under one law, the income tax law. The current 
income tax law No.17/2000 is the third amendment of tax law No.7/1983. The main purpose of 
income tax reform in Indonesia is to increase government revenue, while additional purposes 
include simplification and fairness (Directorate General of Taxation 2007). 
For residents of Indonesia, tax liability is based on both domestic and foreign income. 
The definition of "resident" under current tax law is any individual who lives in Indonesia or 
stays in Indonesia for at least 183 days within 12 months, or who has been in Indonesia for the 
11 
 
whole tax period with the intention of residing there. Non-residents who are subject to taxation 
are individuals who are not residing in the country and are staying for fewer than 183 days 
within 12 months and who have businesses based in Indonesia from which they derive income. 
Other income sources from abroad are not subject to income tax for non-residents.  
Individual income subject to taxation is defined under tax law no. 17/2000 as wages, 
salary, honoraria, pension payments, allowances, insurance premiums, benefits in kind, bonuses, 
and income from business, independent professions, and professional services. Other sources of 
earned income are interest, discounts, insurance and other dividends, surplus of cooperation, 
royalties, lottery winnings, and gains on foreign currency exchange and the sale of property. 
Capital gains are taxed and regulated under corporate income tax laws. 
In Indonesia, each taxpayer has a tax identification number (NPWP). Table A4 shows 
that, the number of taxpayers with taxpayer IDs increased over time, for both individual and 
corporate taxpayers. The total number of individual taxpayers with tax ID numbers in 2004 was 
2,622,184, while the total number of individual and corporate taxpayers with tax IDs was 
3,670,060. Each tax year, the tax authorities' goal is to encourage more taxpayers to get tax IDs 
and submit their annual tax returns.  
 
Behavioral Response Literature 
Recent Literatures on Behavioral Response 
Theoretical studies on income taxes, labor supply, and wages offer ambiguous 
conclusions about taxpayers' behavioral responses to tax reform. Income tax reform in Indonesia 
changes the statutory marginal tax rate (MTR) of individual income tax to be more progressive 
under the current law, thus increasing the tax rate for the highest income group and decreasing it 
12 
 
for others. By estimating these responses and using them to make one policy analysis more 
dynamic, we are better able to determine the distributional implications of changes in the 
individual income tax laws in Indonesia. These changes in income tax law provide a “natural 
experiment” opportunity to analyze behavioral responses to income tax changes. Changes in the 
marginal tax rate and several changes in personal exemptions affect the decisions of taxpayers 
either to comply with, evade, or avoid income tax laws. The empirical literature on income tax 
reform and the behavioral response of taxpayers shows different results depending on the 
estimation method, tax system, and type of data used. The elasticity of reported taxable income 
with respect to the change in statutory marginal tax rate shows the behavioral response of 
taxpayers following such a change, which in turn affects the government's income tax revenues 
following the reform. However, this behavioral response comes from reporting behavior 
(compliance) and labor supply changes in addition to the variables in response due to estimation 
method and tax system. 
Few studies have been done on tax reform behavioral responses in developing countries. 
Rochjadi and Leuthold (1994) estimated the effect of a change in marginal tax rate on labor 
supply responses in Indonesia using cross-sectional data. They estimated the compensated and 
uncompensated labor supply elasticity for various groups of labor across provinces for 1982. 
They used the labor/leisure choice model as the basis of their analysis, derived the labor supply 
elasticity from the basic model, and empirically calculated labor supply elasticity. Some 
demographic characteristics included in their estimation were age, gender, education, region of 
residence, and number of dependents. Using the National Socio-Economic Survey data for 1982 
from the Central Bureau of Statistics—350,000 individuals across provinces—they concluded 
that the labor supply elasticity in Indonesia was relatively small, with a range of -0.2 to -0.6 for 
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uncompensated elasticities and 0.33 to 0.58 for compensated elasticities. As in other literature on 
labor supply elasticities, Rochjadi and Leuthold's results showed that male labor was less elastic 
than female labor. They also concluded that the elasticity they found in their study was 
comparable to labor supply elasticities estimated in developed countries.  
Tax changes may affect labor supply directly and therefore affect the level of reported 
income. The impact of individual income tax rates on labor supply has been an empirical topic in 
many previous studies that attempt to effectively estimate the incidence of a tax on labor. 
Eissa (1995) estimated responsiveness of married women by analyzing labor supply 
changes following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). She estimated the elasticity of labor 
supply for married women with respect to the after-tax wage for high income. She used a basic 
difference-in-difference econometric method to analyze married women in the top percentile 
since she argued that women in this group would be more affected by the reform. The control 
group (married women in the 90th percentile of income) was women less affected by the reform, 
while the treatment group was the income group with the largest change in their tax rate (married 
women in the 75th percentile). Eissa used Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1984 
through 1986 and from 1990 through1992 to estimate the impact of tax reform. Her results 
showed that the number of hours worked for high-income married women increased 90 hours per 
year after the reform where their marginal tax rate had decreased. She concluded that 
participation is to some extent more sensitive to changes in the tax rate than the number of hours 
worked. She also suggested that total elasticity is captured mostly by labor force participation; 
labor supply responsiveness to changes in income tax rates varies among different income 
groups and different demographics. She concluded that the incidence of labor tax on married 
women is not fully borne by labor.  
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Previous studies on the taxpayer behavioral response to the change in MTR have been 
done in several countries using different types of datasets and different types of estimation 
methods.  Lindsey (1987) analyzed taxpayer responsiveness to the 1981 tax rate cut using as a 
baseline a cross-section for all income groups in 1979. He used the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER)-TAXSIM calculator to simulate the base year and to compare the predicted 
simulation result to the actual level of revenue from 1980 through 1984. He estimated the 
elasticity of reporting response using a percentage change in reported taxable income with 
respect to percentage change in after-tax share, and the result showed a wide range in elasticity, 
from 1.6 to 1.8. In Lindsey’s analysis, we are not able to say with certainty that the change in 
reporting was due to changes in compliance behavior or labor supply.  
Another early study on income responsiveness to the change in MTR in the United States 
was conducted by Feldstein (1995). His study analyzed the behavioral response of the same 
individuals to the change in MTR before and after TRA 1986. He used a panel dataset from the 
tax return data produced by the IRS for all income groups from 1985 through 1988. His study 
was also an early study of behavioral response using a DID method. Using different datasets and 
based on different tax reform acts, Feldstein's results were similar to Lindsey's (1987). Feldstein 
also found a large amount of elasticity following TRA 1986 for all income groups, ranging from 
1.04 to 3.05. From these results, he concluded that, since taxpayers are highly responsive to the 
change in MTR, the next tax rate changes in 1993 were unlikely to increase the income tax 
revenue even for a significant increase in the tax rate.  
Long (1999) uncovered behavioral responses using reported taxpayer data from the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1991. Different from other studies on behavioral responses, 
Long's study used cross-sectional data for reported taxable income in 1991. Using a different 
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dataset, he still found a negative relationship between taxable income and the MTR. He 
estimated the elasticity of taxable income with respect to MTR and net-of-tax rate using the 
mean value in each income group. His elasticities were smaller than those presented by Feldstein 
(1995). Long found an elasticity of -0.4 for the income group above $150,000 and concluded that 
a low elasticity for a high-income group implies that any reduction on the tax base would 
generate less revenue gain from this group.  
In the recent literature on behavioral responses to tax reform, the “natural experiment,” or 
difference-in-difference (DID), method has become the most popular. There have been debates 
whether this is a good estimation for behavioral response, since the main assumption of DID is 
that, without any changes in the tax rate, all taxpayers would have been in the same situation. All 
other external factors beyond the tax reform are assumed to have the same impact on all income 
groups. Other debates on this method are whether it would work for the highest income groups 
and whether using tax return data for this method would give accurate information for the 
estimation. 
Behavioral response following the change in MTR is measured primarily using panel 
data. Thoresen and Aarbu (1999) conducted a study on income responsiveness to the change in 
MTR in Norway. Using panel data from 1991 through1994 of 2000 individuals, they used the 
DID model to estimate the elasticity of individuals in the high-income groups who experienced 
larger changes in their MTR relative to those in lower-income groups who experienced smaller 
changes in their MTR after the reform took place in January 1992. Applying two different 
regression methods to correct for endogeneity, 2SLS and synthetic tax rate approach, their results 
showed elasticities ranging from -0.2 to 0.14. These elasticities are very small, but the 
researchers concluded that these numbers are still meaningful and not to be ignored by policy 
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makers in conducting tax reform. Thoresen and Aarbu's overall results showed that income 
response to the change in MTR is very small in Norway. Finally, they concluded that a flat tax 
rate for Norway would not encourage higher-income groups to earn more and hat this should be 
considered by policy makers when changing tax rates. 
Responses by high-income groups have also been the focus of tax reform studies in 
recent literature. Goolsbee estimated income responses to the change in MTR among corporate 
executives categorized as high-income earners (2000) and Goolsbee estimated behavioral 
responses of high-income and median-income earners (2000a). In both papers he used panel data 
from 1991 through 1995 for thousands of top executives in the United States. Using natural 
experiments, he estimated behavioral responses for top corporate executives and for other top-
income groups.  
Goolsbee (2000) found that the elasticity between income and net-of-tax rate shows a 
number above 1, which means that in the short run the high-income group is very responsive to 
the change in MTR. The short-run elasticity is 1.3 for top corporate executives with stock 
options. In the long run, the elasticities range from zero to 0.4 for top executives, excluding 
temporary income components from the income variable. Goolsbee (2000a) concluded that 
previous literature in behavioral response among high-income groups had some measurement 
errors because of false assumptions about higher-income earners. He provided three possible 
problems for using high income as a control group in the DID estimation.4 
 In the same year, Alm and Wallace (2000) also analyzed behavioral response by the very 
rich in the United States using a pooled cross-section micro level dataset from the Individual Tax 
Model Files (ITMF). To estimate the responsiveness of the very rich in terms of the change in 
MTR, they also used a natural experiment assuming that some income groups experienced very 
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large changes in MTR, while others were less affected. They used different types of income to 
test the behavioral response among the rich and between the rich and lower-income groups. 
Using a difference-in-difference econometrics model and the net-of-tax rate, they found that the 
rich are more responsive to the change in MTR relative to lower-income groups. This result is 
different from Thoresen and Aarbu's (1999). One possibility is that different tax systems in the 
United State and in Norway, where they have dual income tax rates, makes the result slightly 
different. 
Another recent study using natural experiment and panel data was a longitudinal study 
conducted by Hansson (2004) to test the effect of the change in MTR in Sweden in 1990−1991. 
The model used growth of taxable income as the dependent variable and net-of-tax rate in 
addition to some individual characteristics such as age, marital status, education, and location as 
independent variables. He used two different approaches—two-stage least square regression and 
a DID model—to estimate taxable income elasticity relative to the change in MTR and compared 
1989 (the year before the tax reform) to 1992 (the year following the reform period). He found 
the elasticity of taxable income relative to the change in MTR in Sweden to range from 0.4 to 
0.5. Individual characteristics showed that college students were more responsive than people 
with less education, women were more responsive than men, and younger people were more 
responsive than older people.  
Further empirical studies of behavioral responses to tax reform in the United States using 
a panel data approach have been done by Saez (2004) and Kopczuk (2004). Both estimated 
taxpayer responses to the changes in MTR and used a broader definition of income than the 
taxable income definition used in previous literature. Saez calculated the elasticity of income by 
dividing the change in income for high-income groups minus that of middle-income groups, 
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divided by the change in net MTR for high-income groups minus that of middle-income groups, 
all in log forms. His definition of income included all income before deductions, excluding 
realized capital gains, transfers, and benefits.  
Kopczuk (2004) defined “broad income” as all income reported in a tax return before any 
deductions. He pointed out an important implication of using “broad income” as his income type: 
any changes in deductions might affect income elasticity. Using panel data from tax returns from 
1979 through2000, and after correcting the possibility of endogeneity from using net-of-tax rate 
as the independent variable, he showed that lower-income groups were less responsive, with an 
elasticity of 0.088 for income groups below $30,000, and that the high-income group was more 
responsive, with an elasticity of 0.156 for income groups above $100,000. He concluded that 
different elasticities between income groups were due to the tax policy. Saez (2004) also found 
similar results. Using panel data from 1960 through 2000, he measured the responsiveness of 
U.S. taxpayers to changes in MTR from the Kennedy cut in the 1960s until the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 and the 1993 tax increase. His results showed that the highest income percentile group 
was more responsive to the change in MTR, while some middle-income groups showed elasticity 
very close to zero, indicating that they were not responsive to the change in MTR over the years.  
Different definitions of income in estimating behavioral responses to tax reform yielded 
different results in elasticity. Similar to Alm and Wallace (2000), both Kopczuk (2004) and Saez 
(2004) calculated MTR at the first dollar before any deductions, used a TAXSIM calculator to 
estimate the MTR, and ran OLS regression using income as a dependent variable and net of 
MTR as the independent variable. Saez (2004) used both panel and time series data for his 
regression and used Newey-West standard errors to correct for the correlation in standard errors 
over time. He also ran a 2SLS regression model in addition to the OLS model to correct for 
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endogeneity. His findings suggested that only the highest income group was responsive to the 
change in MTR from 1960 through1993, while other income groups below the top 1 percent 
showed a very small response to the change in MTR. He also compared two cross-section years 
to estimate the MTR elasticity and found a very wide range in elasticities depending on the 
income tax policy change. In this paper, using tax return data we compared two cross-section 
years to estimate MTR elasticity, which resulted in smaller elasticities than those found in 
previous literature.  
Thomas (2007) used panel data for New Zealand to estimate the responsiveness of 
taxpayers to a 1986 change in marginal tax rate. He measured behavioral responses of taxpayers 
over time using a natural experiment in which some taxpayers were affected by the change in 
marginal tax rate, while others only experienced a slight change in MTR. Assuming they were all 
affected in the same way in other aspects but income tax, this natural experiment would give a 
significant result. Using the taxable income elasticity, Thomas also measured the dead weight 
loss from the current reform in New Zealand. The elasticity of taxable income and labor income 
with respect to the change in marginal tax rate ranged from 0.35 to 1.10, and Thomas concluded 
that different responsiveness of taxpayers in one country to those in another depends on the tax 
structure and different methodologies used to calculate elasticity. 
Another recent panel data study on income responses to the change in MTR has been 
done for Swedish income tax reform by Holmlund and Soderstrom (2007). They used a different 
approach in estimating behavioral response by analyzing both short-run and long-run responses, 
which included some lagged variables for income and MTR, and estimated the difference 
between men and women. Their empirical study used panel data from 1993 through 2002 and 
three different sources of income (earned income, assessed income, and broad income) as the 
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dependent variables. As in previous studies, they used log of income as the dependent variable 
and log net-of-tax rate as the independent variable to capture income responses to the change in 
marginal tax rate. In this case, statutory tax rates were used instead of effective tax rates. They 
also used statutory MTR for the estimation of behavioral response.  
A major tax reform took place in Sweden in 1990 and 1991, which comprised some tax 
cuts and some tax rate increases for high-income groups. In 1995 there was an important change 
in the national tax rate, and in 1999 two new tax brackets were introduced: one at 20 percent and 
one at 25 percent. As in Indonesia's tax system, the Swedish tax system also adopted a dual tax 
system in which earned income is set on a progressive tax rate, while capital income is taxed at a 
flat rate of 30 percent. Under the current law in Indonesia, capital income is taxed at a flat 15 
percent for residents and 20 percent for non-residents. The elasticity result for long-term 
behavioral responses in Holmlund and Soderstrom's paper (2007) ranged from 0.20 to 0.30, 
while the short-term responses were smaller. These results showed long-term responses that were 
larger than short-term results than those in previous studies. Due to an increase in statutory MTR 
for high-income groups, the second result showed no evidence of men's being less responsive to 
the change in MTR but that men were more affected by the change in MTR because most high-
income earners in Sweden are male. 
A study by Alm and Wallace (2007a) used a cross-section of data instead of panel data to 
estimate taxpayer responses to the change in MTR. In their estimation they use ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression and quantile regression to estimate the elasticity of taxpayers in the 
United States on a pure cross-section of data in 1995. They found that there were differences 
across income classes on taxpayer decisions to report income. To test whether there were 
differences in tax-reporting responsiveness across income types, Alm and Wallace used three 
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different income types: wages and salaries, adjusted gross income, and total income. The 
regression results between log of income and net of MTR for OLS and quantile regression 
showed the same negative sign on the coefficient of MTR, which means that as MTR increased, 
taxpayers reported less of their income. The elasticity ranged from -1.53 to -3.69 for the 3 
different types of income and 5 income quantiles. The authors also mentioned that their choice of 
estimation method and using different types of income affected taxpayers' reporting decision 
responsiveness.  
Following Alm and Wallace (2007a), this dissertation uses a cross-section of data to 
estimate taxpayer response to the change in MTR. OLS and quantile regression results show that 
taxpayers in Indonesia are not very responsive to the change in MTR, and in contrast to Saez’s 
(2004) results, the elasticity of the highest income group in this dissertation is very close to zero, 
which means that this group is not responsive to the change in MTR.  
Some caveats of using a natural experiment as an estimation method to measure taxpayer 
responsiveness to the change in MTR are the assumption that other changes besides the tax 
reform affect all taxpayers in the same way and the possibility that endogeneity will arise from 
using both income and the net of MTR as dependent variables. Literature on taxpayer behavioral 
response using natural experiments has also been done for several countries besides the United 
States, but to my knowledge there is no study on behavioral tax responses in Indonesia.  
Following previous literatures on behavioral response to the change in MTR, the 
empirical analysis in this research starts with a “natural experiments” approach, or the DID 
econometrics model, to test behavioral responses of taxpayers before and after tax reform in 
2000. In the DID model, we divide taxpayers into treatment and control groups. The treatment 
group was more affected by the 2000 change in MTR, while the control group was less affected. 
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The DID coefficient shows us how taxpayers in the treatment group responded to the change in 
MTR relative to the control group.  
From the micro-level data on taxpayers, we are able to estimate the effect of tax reform 
on tax reporting decisions by taxpayers. The second method that we use to estimate income 
behavioral response of individuals to changes in marginal tax rates (MTR) is to estimate the 
elasticity of the taxpayers during the year prior to and the year following the tax reform. 
Marginal tax rate elasticity is calculated by the percentage change in taxable income with respect 
to percentage change in marginal tax rate.  
Empirical literature on DID models and on taxpayer responsiveness to the change in 
MTR has been done using cross-sections, pooled cross-sections, and panel data. This study uses 
pooled cross-section taxpayer data from 1998 through 2006. Several different methods of 
estimation have been used in previous literature, and the results are slightly different depending 
on the estimation method used and the different tax system or tax design applied. The taxpayer 
return data in this dissertation does not have any identification for taxpayers; this limitation 
prohibited us from following the same taxpayers over time, so estimating income tax elasticity 
using panel data was not possible. Behavioral response to the change in MTR in some countries 
is very small. In this paper we used a cross-section of taxable income elasticities between income 
groups before and after 2000, which yielded a very small number. This means that taxpayers 
were not responsive to the change in MTR—even those who experienced a large change in their 
MTR following the income tax reform.  
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Microsimulation Literature 
Microsimulation Model  
Microsimulation modeling has been used in several countries to analyze government 
policy and forecasting. The recent trend is using dynamic microsimulation for government policy 
forecasting. The dynamic microsimulation model includes behavioral response and forecasts the 
effects of a change in government policy on the population or a sample of individuals, 
households, or firms. Dynamic microsimulation is expensive and needs more detailed 
information for the micro dataset. Another microsimulation process is static microsimulation, 
which basically needs cross-section information on individuals or firms at a certain point in time 
as the base year; behavioral change is not accounted for in this model (Harding 2000).  
Stepankova (2002) describes microsimulation methods and the redistribution of tax and 
social benefit. She describes a static simulation model with cross-sectional data, not taking into 
account any behavioral response, and two types of dynamic microsimulation using panel and 
cross-sectional data. We will use static microsimulation and dynamic behavior microsimulation 
to analyze the change in MTR and personal exemptions in Indonesia. As mentioned by 
Stepankova, the static simulation assumes no changes in individual characteristics of taxpayers. 
The dynamic simulation with cross-sectional data includes behavioral responses of taxpayers 
regarding the change in tax rates.  
Stepankova (2002) mentions the importance of a microlevel database for the 
microsimulation model. The best would be a panel dataset following the same taxpayers over 
time. Using cross-sectional data would be less expensive because data for confidential 
information on taxpayers is not easy to get. For Czech Republic, Stepankova claims that 
microsurvey data is the best sample survey data for microsimulation. Another type of survey 
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data, from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), is not an appropriate data type for 
microsimulation because the sample is not random but based on quotas. In Indonesia, Socio-
Economic Household Survey (Susenas) data would be an option for microsimulation databases, 
but unfortunately the income survey in the Susenas data is only available every three years, and 
the only income information it contains is net tax wages and salaries.  
Harding (2000) describes the trend of static and dynamic microsimulation and describes 
the advantages of using dynamic microsimulation, which allows for the possibility of following a 
particular individual over time in the presence of policy change. It is thus possible to track 
taxpayer characteristics and to answer questions regarding policy changes following a particular 
taxpayer profile over time. 
Naylor (2000) addresses an overview of statistics on individual taxation regarding 
sampling data, tax modeling to simulate policy changes, and the challenges of putting together a 
microdatabase. He gives an overview of Canada’s microsimulation process. The process of 
collecting microdata for individual taxpayers started with income tax returns. Sample selection is 
the next step for building the database, and after some manual checking and corrections, the final 
tax return data are placed on the sample file, ready for use.  
The microsimulation model that Naylor (2000) described was a flexible model used to 
analyze any tax policy changes at the Department of Revenue in Canada. The simulation process 
started with data processing and inputting the elements of the current system into the tax 
calculator. If the information from the sample data is not enough to explain the policy changes, 
other information can be added into the calculator. This simulation process was done in Canada 
initially by the Department of Finance. Issues regarding data collection include confidentiality of 
taxpayer information and limited availability of information on taxpayers. The tax return process 
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is by self-assessment, and the government of Canada tried to simplify and reduce the burden of 
self-assessment by reducing the information that needed to be filed by taxpayers. 
 
Empirical Microsimulation across Countries 
McNab and Wallace (2000) conducted an empirical microsimulation analysis for 
corporate profit tax and value-added tax in the Russian Federation. They developed a 
microsimulation model for corporations in Moscow City without including behavioral response. 
The objective of their model was to analyze the changes in federal tax law on the enterprise 
profit tax (EPT) and value-added tax (VAT). The micro-level database that they used in their 
analysis was combined data from the Territorial Tax Inspectorates (TTIs) of Moscow City. The 
data consist of observations from the 1st quarter of 1993 through the 3rd quarter of 1995. Their 
results suggested that a one percentage increase in the corporate profit tax and an increase in 
fixed capital depreciation decrease the overall tax liability but increase liabilities of smaller firms 
with fewer assets. Another result shows that the distribution of winners only applied to one 
industry group, while others are either losers or unchanged. They concluded that the 
microsimulation results were important for informing policymakers of how a small change in tax 
rates and capital depreciation could hurt smaller firms even when the aggregate liabilities 
decreased.  
An empirical microsimulation analysis for Czech Republic was conducted by Vecernik 
and Stepankova (2002) using the household income microcensus survey data for 1988 and 1996. 
They proposed two scenarios, including a flat tax rate of 15 percent and total child benefits with 
a more progressive tax rate. The current income tax rate in Czech Republic is progressive. As in 
other transitional countries, microsimulation models are not a very popular method for policy 
26 
 
analysis in Czech Republic. The result showed that a flat income tax rate of 15 percent is too 
costly, which means that it made the distribution of the tax burden larger than under the current 
progressive system. The second scenario result indicated that a more progressive rate might be 
more equitable but that imposing a universal child benefit into the scenario made it less 
equitable. The researchers concluded that the results of their microsimulation under two different 
scenarios still needed to be verified using better data sources.  
Granell-Perez, et al. (2006), did a more recent empirical study on static microsimulation 
using Spain's income tax. They used cross-sectional sample data on Spanish taxpayers in 2002 
that contained information on taxpayer income by region. The analysis focused on the change 
needed in regional tax policies in order to collect the same amount of tax income. They designed 
a microsimulation module using STATA to get the result for tax differences between current and 
proposed scenarios. They proposed a scenario that eliminated the tax credit from the regional tax 
system and reduced tax rates. The results on winners and losers reported that only the two 
highest income groups experienced a net gain from the proposed regional tax scenario. The 
results also showed that the proposed scenario was less progressive since only a few people 
benefited from the tax credit.  
Alm and Wallace (2007) developed a microsimulation process to address vertical and 
horizontal equity in Jamaica’s income tax on labor. They used Jamaica’s Emolument Survey data 
of 2001. The data consist of laborers’ earned income with no information on capital income. 
Capital income is reported on different return forms and is taxed at a different progressive rate 
than labor income. This is similar to the situation in Indonesia, where taxpayers need to report 
capital income on a different return form from their labor income return form because they are 
taxed at different rates. Alm and Wallace highlighted the fact that in Jamaica only laborers in 
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certain sectors are taxed. They proposed three proposed scenario: the first option was to 
eliminate all non-taxed allowances, the second was to eliminate non-taxed gratuities, and the last 
was to eliminate non-taxed bonus income. Their result showed that the first option, as they 
expected, had more effect on the entire distribution of equity. They found that the three options 
gave different results according to the target of each scenario. The first option had a broader 
impact on the distribution of equity in all income groups, while the third was more targeted to 
high-income groups.  
 
Conclusion 
 Previous studies on behavioral response mentioned in this chapter suggest that taxpayers 
in lower income groups are less responsive to the change in their marginal tax rate than higher 
income groups. Literature on behavioral response across countries suggests that elasticity of 
taxable income with respect to marginal tax rate depends on the tax system and on the method of 
estimation. Few studies outside the United States separated the labor and compliance responses 
to tax rate changes to explain changes in reported income. The empirical literature on the effect 
of income tax reform on taxpayers suggests that taxpayers that experience more reduction on 
their marginal tax rates report more of their income after the reform relative to taxpayers who do 
are least affected by the change in marginal tax rate.  
The literature on microsimulation across countries shows that the microsimulation model 
is a useful tool for informing policy makers about the distribution of income tax burden, revenue 
changes following a change in tax systems, and tax differences between current and proposed 
scenarios. Microsimulation requires a microlevel database with detailed information on each 
individual or firm. Literature in this chapter also describes that static and dynamic 
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microsimulation options depend on the needs of each simulation. Static simulations assume that 
behavioral responses of individual or firms are constant. On the other hand, the dynamic 
microsimulation tax calculator takes into account behavioral responses.
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter describes the theoretical framework for income tax and presents the 
theoretical model that supports the empirical model. As motivation for the theory, the first 
section describes the structure of individual income tax in Indonesia. The theoretical model in 
this dissertation is the labor/leisure choice model with the imposition of progressive income tax 
into budget constraints. As an addition to the labor/leisure choice model, we present a summary 
of tax avoidance theory. The last part of this chapter is conclusion. 
 
The Structure of Individual Income Tax in Indonesia 
 The definition of "income" in Indonesia’s tax system is any additional increase in a 
taxpayer’s economic welfare, from any sources either in Indonesia or outside the country that 
can be used for consumption or to increase the taxpayer’s wealth.7 Any additional economic 
resource is included within the tax base only if it is realized.8 The unit of income tax in Indonesia 
is the individual. Taxpayers can take some personal exemptions based on their marital status, but 
they are considered as individuals rather than as families. There is only one taxable income 
threshold for all individuals, regardless of marital status. Additional exemptions are available for 
married individuals and for individuals with dependents, for a maximum of three dependents for 
                                                 
7
 See Income Tax Law No. 17/2000, Article 4, paragraph 1. 
 
8
 See Appendix A for a list of income sources. 
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each taxpayer.9 The income tax base is taxable income defined as annual net income minus 
personal exemptions. Pensions and personal allowances are deducted from gross income. 
Unearned income is taxed at a different rate. Taxable income includes wages, salaries, honoraria, 
bonuses, pensions, lottery prizes and awards, gains from sale of property, refunds of tax 
payments already deducted as cost, and royalties. Since the law changed in 1983, benefits in kind 
are taxed under income tax law, pensions received are taxable after retirement, and any pension 
paid by an employer is not included in the employee’s taxable income. Figure 1 presents the 
schematic of the individual income tax structure in Indonesia. The rates of personal exemptions 
are based on the current rate implemented in 2006.  
Figure 1. Individual Income Tax Structure 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Directorate General of Taxation, 2007 
Note: Indicates the main components in calculating taxable income 
 
Taxpayers report gross income on the income tax return form, deducting personal 
allowances at 5 percent for each taxpayer, or a maximum of IDR 1,296,000 ($144). Gross 
                                                 
9
 As mentioned earlier, additional exemptions for the same dependents can be claimed by one taxpayer. If a father 
already claimed his children, the mother can exempt only herself. If a husband already claimed additional exemption 
for being married, the wife can claim only herself. On the other hand, there is an additional exemption for married 
women who receive income from a source other than their husbands or another person in the family. 
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income minus personal allowance equals annual net income. From the annual net income, 
taxpayers can take some personal exemptions based on their marital status and number of 
dependents. Personal exemptions consist of an exemption for each taxpayer, IDR 13.2 million 
($1,467), plus an additional IDR 1.2 million ($133) for married taxpayers, and an additional IDR 
1.2 million ($133) for each of up to three dependents. Married women can exempt an additional 
IDR 13.2 million ($1,467).10 A married taxpayer with dependents can claim an additional 
exemption for being married and for having dependents, but his spouse can exempt only herself. 
Taxable income equals annual net income minus personal exemptions. 
 
Applicable Theoretical Model 
One of the theoretical models that this dissertation appeals to is the standard model of 
labor/leisure choice. In micro theory, the impact of imposing income tax on labor is ambiguous, 
depending on the substitution and income effect. The basic labor/leisure choice model is a 
maximization model of an individual or family subject to a budget constraint that consists of 
potential earned and unearned income and a time constraint (Varian 1992, Nicholson 2002). We 
will impose an income tax into the budget constraint to analyze the effect of tax on labor supply 
decisions. Macrae and Yezer (1976), Moffit (1979), and Slemrod (2001) extend the basic 
labor/leisure model by imposing a progressive income tax rate. It is important to estimate the 
labor responses since there are no readily available labor elasticity estimates for Indonesia and 
because we want to add income behavioral responses to the microsimulation model.  
The standard labor/leisure choice model is:  
 
                                                 
10
 Recall that a married woman who has income from any source unrelated to her spouse or any other members in 
the family is eligible for an additional exemption of IDR 13.2 million ($1,466.67). 
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Before the presence of any tax, the general budget constraint is , where L is 
leisure, Y is total reported income or consumption, W is wage, and Z is non-wage income. The 
time constraint is the total number of potential hours (1), including leisure (L), plus the amount 
of time spent working (N), which is equal to 1=L+N. 
Literature on income tax and labor supply suggests different ways of imposing income 
tax into the budget constraint, depending on the tax structure (Macrae and Yezer 1976, Boadway 
and Wildasin 1984, Triest 1990, Slemrod 2001, Eissa 2002). This dissertation imposes 
progressive income tax into the labor/leisure choice model following Slemrod (2001). The 
imposition of progressive a marginal tax rate is associated with the change in taxable income. 
Taxpayers in the higher taxable income tax brackets are taxed at a higher rate. In Indonesia, the 
individual income tax system is a non-linear progressive tax with an increasing marginal tax rate. 
Under current law, there are five taxable income brackets with progressive marginal tax rates. 
The budget constraint is a non-linear kinked line.  
 The general budget constraint after imposing progressive income tax is represented as: 
 
   
 
Where ti is the tax rate imposed on ith income tax bracket, and Z is the unearned income. There 
were three income tax brackets before the income tax reform in 2000, five income brackets after 
2000, and four income brackets for the proposed income tax law. As mentioned earlier, 
Indonesia imposes a different tax rate for unearned income.  
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 The budget constraint including progressive income is: 
 
  
 
The maximization problem is equation (3.1) subject to equation (3.3). As in the general model, 
the first order condition equates the marginal rate of substitution between total income and 
leisure and the relative price of leisure, MRSL,Y = (1-ti) W.  
The time allocation utility function after the imposition of a progressive income tax is: 
 
 
 
The first order condition yields the marginal rate of substitution between taxpayer leisure time: 
 
 
 
 
Equation (3.5) shows that the relative price of leisure, or the amount of income that a taxpayer is 
willing to exchange for leisure time, is equal to the amount of wages after tax. The first order 
conditions are used to solve for the optimal amounts of labor supply and leisure demand. 
 The implicit function consists of all variables in the budget constraint F [L, W (1-ti), Z]. 
The Marshallian leisure demand L* = L [W(1-ti), Z] and the Marshallian labor supply N*=1-L*, 
which is the negative of leisure demand N* = 1- L [W(1-ti), Z]. 
The Slutsky equation for leisure demand is: 
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The Slutsky equation for labor supply is: 
 
 
 
Following Slemrod (2001), the effect of tax on labor supply yields: 
 
 
 
The Slutsky equation above shows that the change in labor supply with respect to the change in 
wages after tax equals the substitution effect, holding utility constant plus the income effect, 
which is the change in non-wage income. Equation (3.6) shows the Slutsky equation for leisure 
demand, which has the opposite sign from the Slutsky labor supply equation in (3.7). The 
substitution effect of leisure demand with respect to the change in wages after tax is positive, 
which implies that, holding utility constant, an increase in wages after tax increases the number 
of hours worked, and the second part of the right-hand side of equation (3.7) implies that the 
income effect is negative. The Slutsky equation in (3.7) implies the positive substitution effect 
and negative income effect. This is the ambiguity of the labor/leisure choice model.11 Following 
                                                 
11
 See Appendix B for a full derivation of the labor/leisure choice model. 
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Slemrod (2001), equation (3.8) presents the ambiguity of labor supply subject to a change in tax 
rate.  
The substitution elasticity of the change in labor supply with respect to the change in 
wages after tax can be defined following the elasticity equation by Nicholson (2002): 
 
 
 
Multiply (3.8) by  to get: 
 
The labor supply substitution elasticity equation becomes: 
 
 
The empirical calculations of labor supply elasticity for a change in income tax would be 
possible if data on taxes and hours worked were available. Unfortunately, the household survey 
data (Susenas) for income is available only as a series of cross-sections every 3 years. We are 
able to empirically estimate elasticities using the variation in wages among individuals. These 
elasticities will be total rather than compensated elasticities. However, for revenue analysis 
purposes, total elasticities are expected to be relevant. We compare these relatively imperfect 
labor supply elasticities with those found in other countries and, eventually, with the reporting 
behavior elasticities that are discussed next.12 
                                                 
12
 We present elasticity results for other countries in the literature review.  
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Another theoretical notion that we appeal to in this dissertation is the induced reporting 
decision response of individuals as tax rates change. Aside from the labor decision, the tax 
compliance literature suggests that individuals faced with increases (or decreases) in marginal 
tax rates will evade tax responsibility more (or less). The reasons for this are well established in 
the literature, including the seminal work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). More recent studies 
on tax avoidance have been done by Slemrod (2001) and Alm and Wallace (2007).13 A summary 
of this theory is presented in this section.  
Literature on tax compliance has mentioned that the decisions of taxpayers to report all or 
some of their income depend on the cost of evasion, penalty rate, and probability of getting 
caught. Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2001) presented a review of tax compliance theory, arguing 
that, besides the cost of evasion and the penalty rate, compliance decision is also affected by tax 
audit, tax rate, and tax withholding function. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented 
theoretical analysis on static and dynamic characteristics of the decision of tax evasion. Slemrod 
(2001) presented a general labor/leisure choice model with the imposition of tax avoidance into 
the budget constraint. The cost of tax avoidance depends on reported income.  
We will present a summary of tax avoidance theory developed by Alm and Wallace 
(2007a), which described a more specific theoretical model of tax avoidance in which the cost of 
avoidance depends on the total fixed amount of income. Consider an individual who has a choice 
of reporting his fixed amount of income M as taxable income R or choosing tax avoidance A. The 
taxable income is subject to a progressive income tax T(R), where the first and second 
derivatives of the progressive income tax schedule are both positive (T’>0 and T”>0). The cost 
of avoidance depends on the total fixed amount of income C (A/M) where the first and second 
derivatives of avoidance cost are both positive (C’>0 and C”>0). The cost of avoidance includes 
                                                 
13
 See the literature review for a summary of tax avoidance literature by Alm and Wallace (2007a). 
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the costs of obtaining information, keeping records, paying for tax advice, and buying and selling 
assets that provide tax shelters.   
Consider an individual who maximizes utility between taxable income R and tax 
avoidance A, which is assumed to depend only upon income. Given the progressive income tax 
schedule T(R) and the cost of avoidance C (A/M), the first order condition of the maximization 
model yields: 
 
-T’(R) + C’(A/M) = 0        (3.10) 
 
T’(R) = C’(A/M)  
 
The marginal benefit of progressive income tax schedule T’(R) equals the marginal cost 
of tax avoidance C’(A/M). 
Since T”(R)>0 and C”(A/M) > 0, the second order condition yields: 
 
T”(R) + C”(A/M) > 0                                                                                   (3.11) 
 
As mentioned earlier, both marginal tax rates and marginal tax avoidance costs are increasing, 
hence the second order derivative is also positive.  
To analyze the reporting decision of taxpayers as an impact of a change in marginal tax 
rate, Alm and Wallace (2007a) also presented an example where an increase in marginal tax rate 
is imposed into the marginal tax rate function. The impact of an increase in marginal tax rate on 
the reporting decision of taxpayers shows a negative effect, which means that an increase in 
marginal tax rates would reduce the amount of income that an individual reports on his or her tax 
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return.14 Imposing an income tax shift parameter into the progressive income tax schedule, the 
first order condition yields [T’(R)+t], where t is a shift parameter.  
∂R/∂t = -1/[T”(R)+C”(A/M)]       (3.12) 
 
Equation (3.12) can be interpreted as meaning that an increase in marginal tax rates will reduce 
the amount of reporting income. The change in taxable income is subject to a change in marginal 
tax rate defined as taxable income elasticity η ≡ [(∂R/∂t)(t/R)]. Lindsey 1987, Feldstein 1995, 
Alm and Wallace 2000, and Alm and Wallace 2007a emphasized that reporting decision is a 
more extensive response than labor supply response. The reporting decision is expected to vary 
across income groups, and literature on reporting income response in the United Sates shows that 
even if marginal tax rates increase with income, the rate declines as income increases, which 
implies that T”(R) is generally larger for lower-income groups than for higher-income groups. 
The responsiveness of taxpayers in their reporting decision will differ across income groups. In 
developing countries, empirical evidence on reporting decisions is still very limited. 
 
Conclusion 
The current individual income tax rate in Indonesia is a progressive rate. The theoretical 
model of labor/leisure choice maximization suggests that imposing progressive income tax on 
the budget constraint by substitution effect has a positive effect on labor supply decision but that 
by that doing so by income effect has a negative effect on the labor supply decision. The 
conclusion of the theoretical labor/leisure choice model is that there is an ambiguity between 
substation and income effect. Since the dataset in this dissertation is taxpayer income tax return 
data from withholding income, we assume that the labor supply decision is related to reporting 
                                                 
14
 See Alm and Wallace (2007) for a complete derivation of the impact of an increase in marginal tax rate to the 
reporting decision of taxpayers. 
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decision. To measure behavioral response in the empirical chapter, we use taxable income 
responsiveness to the change in statutory marginal tax rate. The behavioral response in this 
dissertation is income behavioral response, which is the taxable income response. The theory of 
income tax avoidance by Alm and Wallace (2007a) suggests that reporting decision by taxpayers 
across income groups decreases as the marginal tax rate increases.
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The objective of this empirical analysis is to develop an empirical model of income 
responses to the change in marginal tax rate and to test the microsimulation model that we have 
described in the theoretical chapter. The Indonesian income tax reform in 2000 changed the 
statutory marginal tax rate for all income groups. The highest income groups suffer from a higher 
marginal tax rate following the reform, while other income groups experienced a reduction in 
their marginal tax rate. Since changes in the MTR differ across income groups, the main 
objective of using a DID model in this empirical analysis is to examine whether the reporting 
behavior differs across income groups. Behavioral response and reporting decision are estimated 
using labor supply elasticity from the household socio-economic survey data (Susenas) and from 
the income tax return data from 2000, the year of the tax reform.  
Empirical literature on behavioral response suggests that using a difference-in-difference 
(DID) model to test the effect of the change in marginal tax rate on income before and after tax 
reform would give us information on how taxpayers in the most affected income group behave 
relative to those who are not affected or are least affected by the change in MTR. The DID 
model includes a time-specific factor: the year of the tax reform. The differences in response of 
the highly affected income groups are compared to the least affected income groups before and 
after the reform. This model also consists of the interaction variable between the dummy of time-
specific variable and the dummy for reporting income of the highly affected income group. In 
this empirical analysis we use a DID model to observe the differences in reporting behavior 
across income groups after the enactment of the current marginal tax rate. The income elasticity 
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with respect to the change in marginal tax rate is calculated by income groups. We do not use the 
marginal tax rate elasticity from the DID model for the dynamic income behavior 
microsimulation; instead, we generate ten income groups by their taxable income, from the 
lowest to the highest taxable income, and calculate the elasticity by the difference in taxable 
income before and after the tax reform in 2000, with respect to the percentage change in 
marginal tax rate by income group.  
The empirical estimation consists of a simulation on the base year, a static simulation 
without income behavior, and a dynamic income behavior simulation. We will present several 
options for reform that are currently being discussed by the tax authorities for the near-future 
income tax reform, and we will also present an option for a flat individual income tax rate. The 
objective of the microsimulation model is to analyze the distribution of income tax burden across 
income groups under several options of reform and to examine the amount of government 
income tax revenue from the number of tax liabilities.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows: the first part is data description and 
sources. We describe the variables for the DID model and how we constructed each variable into 
the model, describe variables for the tax calculator in the microsimulation model, and provide 
information on the data sources. The second part of this chapter provides the hypotheses, 
empirical model for the DID, constructs the calculation for labor supply elasticity and marginal 
tax rate elasticity, and develops the microsimulation process. 
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Data Description and Sources 
 
Dependent and Independent Variables for DID model 
The dependent variable for DID regression is the total income reported by taxpayers via 
form 1721A1 both before and after 2000. As mentioned in the previous chapter, reported income 
from form 1721A1 is withholding income from the employer. We use only wage income for this 
analysis because non-wage income is taxed under a different rate.  
The independent variables for the DID regression include a time-specific dummy 
variable, defined as dummy = 1 for the years after 2000 and = 0 for the years before 2000. A 
dummy for the income treatment group = 1 for taxpayers in the income group that is most 
affected by the change in MTR (the income group that experienced the largest reduction in MTR 
after 2000) and = 0 for the control group, which comprises taxpayers in the highest income 
group, who are least affected or experienced the smallest percentage change in MTR. 
Additionally, there is an interaction variable between the time-specific dummy and the dummy 
for the income treatment group, as well as individual specific variables, such as a dummy for 
marital status and number of dependents. 
 
Variables for Microsimulation 
Variables for microsimulation consist of all the reported income variables from the 
income tax return form. The tax calculator starts by using income variables from the base year.15 
The variables include annual gross income and annual net income, personal exemptions, taxable 
income, marginal tax rate, and income tax liability for the base year. For a simulation with 
proposed scenarios, we use a new taxable income, new marginal tax rate, and new personal 
                                                 
15
 2006 is the baseline year for the microsimulation model under the current scenario. 
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exemptions; we use income behavioral response variables, including percentage change in 
taxable income and percentage change in marginal tax rate, and we also use the elasticity of 
taxable income with respect to the change in marginal tax rate.  
The tax calculator for the microsimulation on proposed scenarios calculates a new 
marginal tax rate by using the new taxable income, captures a new income tax liability, and 
estimates the income tax burden under proposed scenarios and the tax difference between the 
current and proposed scenarios. The new taxable income is basically the old taxable income plus 
an adjustment on the income behavioral response. For the static microsimulation, income 
behavioral response is not included into the tax calculator, while for the dynamic behavior 
microsimulation model we apply elasticity for each income group and the change in marginal tax 
rate. 
 
Data Sources  
The data we use in this analysis derive from the 1998−2006 reported individual income 
tax return dataset from the Directorate General of Taxation (DGT) in Indonesia. Each taxpayer is 
responsible for submitting tax form 1721A1 (employer-withholding wage income) by the end of 
each tax year. Employers, as the withholding party, must also submit this form to the tax 
authorities at the end of tax year. The dataset includes pooled cross-section micro-level data that 
contain detailed information on taxpayers’ wage income (non-wage income is not included). The 
whole dataset contains 8 million taxpayer records. There is no top coding for the highest income 
group. The taxpayer name, tax identification number (Nomor Pokok Wajib Pajak, or NPWP), 
and other confidential identifying information are excluded from the dataset to maintain taxpayer 
confidentiality.  
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The advantage of using a reported income tax return dataset is in the detailed information 
provided for all taxpayers. Reported incomes by taxpayers are annual gross income, net income, 
annual net income, personal exemptions, taxable income, statutory marginal tax rate, income tax 
liability, and individual characteristics.16 The main limitation of using this dataset is the 
unavailability of a panel dataset for the whole period from 1998 through 2006 due to a lack of 
identifying information. Another limitation is the restricted nature of information on individual 
characteristics. For confidentiality purposes, we could get information only on marital status and 
number of dependents. Individual information on region, type of job, age, and gender are 
excluded.  
 
Hypotheses 
The empirical work in this dissertation attempts to examine taxpayers’ responsiveness to 
the change in MTR following the income tax reform of 2000. Another attempt of the empirical 
work is to examine the distribution of tax burden for each income group after applying the new 
MTR. Income tax burden is estimated using microsimulation modeling.  
The hypothesis for the DID model is obtained from the labor supply theoretical model, 
with some modifications. The reporting decision is considered a more extensive decision than the 
labor supply decision (Alm and Wallace 2000). In this dissertation, we assume that the reported 
wage income reflects the labor supply response and the reporting decision. We use the DID 
model to estimate the difference in reporting decision by taxpayers across income groups, 
depending on the change in marginal tax rate. The hypothesis for the DID model is that, on 
average, the difference in reporting wage income between the treatment group (the highly 
                                                 
16
  Descriptive Statistics for all the variables are available in Appendix C. 
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affected income group) and to the control group (the least affected income group) should be 
positive.  
As mentioned in the literature review, empirical studies on labor supply elasticity in 
Indonesia showed low elasticity, with a range from -0.2 to -0.6 for uncompensated elasticities 
and a range from 0.33 to 0.58 for compensated elasticities (Rochjadi and Leuthold 1994). Based 
on these findings, labor supply elasticity and reporting elasticity in Indonesia should be low, 
given that employees have very limited control over the number of hours they work and that 
withholding income tax amounts are reported by both the employee and employer.  
The objective of income tax reform is to increase government revenue at a lower cost of 
burden. Increasing personal exemptions or lowering the marginal tax rate is expected to ease the 
distribution of income tax burden across income groups. Previous literature on distribution of 
income tax burden suggests that, under a progressive income tax rate, an increase in exemptions 
ambiguously eases the burden on lower-income groups. According to Keen et al. (2000), 
progressivity of income tax could be evaluated from the reduction in income tax liability or from 
the after-tax income inequality. Theoretically, Keen et al. suggest, an increase in exemptions 
could lead to a more unequal distribution of income tax. Our hypothesis for the microsimulation 
is that, from the equity point of view, the distribution of tax burden under the current income tax 
rate could be better distributed by making changes in both MTR and personal exemptions.  
 
Model Specifications 
The Modified Difference-in-Difference Model 
The objective of this model specifications section is to develop an empirical model for 
the DID regression. The model starts with a simple ordinary least square (OLS) model, 
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consisting of reported income as the dependent variable and taxpayer specifications and time 
specifications as the independent variables. In previous literature, Alm and Wallace (2002) 
constructed their DID model based on a simple OLS model and used reported income as the 
dependent variable to test responses of the high-income group relative to the low-income groups 
before and after the tax reform act in 1986.  
Where y
 
is the reported income, x is the explanatory variables, and ɛ
 
is the error term, the 
baseline for the DID regression equation is: 
 
  
 
 The DID econometrics model in this dissertation is an estimation of reported income 
behavioral response across income groups. This DID estimation uses data before and after the 
income tax reform in 2000. As previously mentioned in the literature review chapter, there are 
debates on using the DID, or “natural experiment,” model for estimation on the effect of the 
change in MTR. The main assumption about this estimation is that the only shocks that cause 
different effects on the income groups are the changes in MTR, while macroeconomics shocks 
would have the same effect on all income groups.  
The model for DID starts from the basic OLS equation in (4.1) and is modified by 
including the DID variable, which is the interaction variable between the dummy for the income 
treatment group and the dummy variable for years after the reform. The construction of the DID 
model in this dissertation follows the model by Alm and Wallace 2000, Moffitt and Wilhelm 
2000, and Martinez et al. 2006. The DID estimation uses the reported income tax return dataset 
as pooled cross-sectional data from 1998 through 2006.  
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The DID equation is: 
 
Y=α1 + β1 DPost + β2 DTreatment + β3 DPost* DTreatment + β4 married + β5 dependent + ε           (4.2) 
 
Where Y is the reported income as in equation (4.1), Dpost is a dummy variable for years after 
2000, Dtreatment is a dummy for the treatment group, married is a dummy for marital status equals 
1 if the taxpayer is married and 0 otherwise, dependent is the number of dependents (maximum 3 
dependents per taxpayer), and ɛ is the error term.  
The construction of treatment and control groups is based on the effect of the change in 
statutory marginal tax rate for each income group. There are five groups based on taxable 
income. The treatment group is income groups that are highly affected by the change in marginal 
tax rate after 2000, and the control group is the least affected income group. After the tax reform 
in 2000, the two highest income groups are the least affected income groups, but the highest 
income group suffers from an increase in their marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate for the 
highest income group with taxable income over IDR 200 million increased from 30 percent to 35 
percent, while for other income groups the marginal tax rate decreased after 2000. 
Table 2. Statutory Marginal Tax Rate (MTR) and Percentage Change in MTR Before and After 
2000, by Income Group 
Income Group MTR 
Before 2000 
MTR 
After 2000 
%∆ MTR 
i. <=25 million($2,778) 10% 5% -0.5 
ii. >25 million & <= 50 million 
($5,556) 
15% 10% -0.333 
iii. >50 million & <= 100 million 30% 15% -0.5 
iv. >100 million($11,111) & <= 
200 million 
30% 25% -0.167 
v. >200 million($22,222) 30% 35% +0.167 
Source: Directorate General of Taxation (DGT) 2007 and author’s own calculation 
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Table 2 shows the percentage change in statutory MTR after the income tax reform in 
2000. Based on the numbers presented in Table 2, we use the highest income group and the 
second highest income group as the control group and other income groups as treatment groups. 
The change in statutory MTR mostly affects low- and middle-income groups, while the two 
highest income groups are the least affected. 
 
Taxable Income Elasticity 
The estimation of elasticity uses survey data to find labor supply elasticity for labor and 
employees and uses income tax return data to estimate reporting elasticity of taxpayers. In order 
to create a dynamic income behavior microsimulation model, we need taxable income elasticity. 
Including elasticity into the tax calculator simulation process generates a new taxable income 
with the income behavioral response of taxpayers after the change in MTR. The elasticity of 
taxable income with respect to statutory MTR is calculated by the difference in taxable income 
and MTR before and after 2000. The taxable income elasticity is calculated by income group.  
 
 
 
 
The elasticity of labor supply decision (calculated using number of hours worked by 
labor and employees) and reporting elasticity (estimated using reporting income with respect to 
the change in MTR) give us information on how responsive taxpayers are to the change in their 
MTR. Elasticity results enter the dynamic income behavior simulation model to capture 
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behavioral responses and in order to calculate a new taxable income amount for simulating the 
proposed scenarios.  
 
Microsimulation Model 
The microsimulation model in this dissertation includes static and dynamic income 
behavior simulation. We use 2006 as the base year and simulate the proposed scenarios on the 
same year. The static simulation on the proposed scenarios is a microsimulation process using 
the same data as the base year but with different scenarios. The dynamic income behavior 
microsimulation is a simulation that uses reported income elasticity in the tax calculator to 
estimate the change in income tax liabilities and income tax burden after including income 
behavioral response into the model. In this dissertation we do not develop dynamic 
microsimulation with forecasting or growth models.  
The tax calculator for the microsimulation calculates taxable income, defined as annual 
net income minus personal exemptions. The tax liability is calculated by multiplying taxable 
income times the marginal tax rate. The main objective of the microsimulation model in this 
dissertation is to estimate the income tax burden for each scenario, total income tax revenue with 
respect to taxpayers' income tax liability, and the income tax differences between the base 
scenario and the proposed scenario.  
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Figure 2. The Microsimulation Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro Data (Reporting Income) 
Tax Calculator: 
• Total reporting income(I)-Personal Allowance =Annual Net Income(Y) 
• Taxable Income (TI)(s0) = Annual Net Income (W) – Personal Exemption (PEx)(s0) 
• Tax Liability (TL)(s0) = Taxable Income (TI)(s0) * Marginal Tax Rate (MTR)(s0) 
 
∑Tax Burden (TB)(s0) over Income Groups 
Policy Simulations 
 
• ∆ Personal Exemption  
• ∆ Marginal Tax Rate (MTR) 
 
Static Simulation (S1) 
 
1. TL(s1) = TI(s1) * PEx(s1) and TL(s1) = TI(s1) * MTR(s1)  
2. TB(s1) =  
3. ∑TB(s1) over Income Groups 
4. Tax Difference(s1) = TL(s1) – TL(s0) 
5. Winners vs. Losers (s1):  
o Winners if Tax Difference(s1) < 0 
o Losers if Tax Difference(s1) > 0 
Behavioral Response Simulation (S2) 
 
1. TI(s2) = [(e *% MTR)+1] +TI(s0) 
2. TL(s2) = TIs2 * PExs2 and TL(s2) = TI(s2) * MTR(s2) 
3. TB(s2) =  
4. ∑TB(s2) over Income Groups 
5. Tax Difference(s2) = TL(s2) – TL(s0) 
6. Winners vs. Losers (s2): 
o  Winners if Tax Difference(s2) < 0 
o Losers if Tax Difference(s2) > 0 
 
Figure 2 describes the microsimulation process starting from running income tax return 
data for the base year, 2006, using that year's marginal tax rate. Total reported income tax returns 
in 2006 were 902,343.17 For this microsimulation process, we designed a program in STATA 
                                                 
17
 The total dataset that we have includes 1998 through 2006. In this dissertation we only present a simulation for 
2006. We use other years for the DID regression. The total number of observations for the whole dataset was 
5,580,771. The data comes from income tax return form 1721A1 from all effective taxpayers in Indonesia. 
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that generated a tax calculator for the static simulation on the base year and compared the result 
with the dynamic simulation result obtained from each proposed scenario.  
The first simulation process on the base year shows results on the distribution of income 
tax burden across income groups under that year's law. The next process is simulating the 
proposed scenarios using the same year but with new income tax liabilities, taking into account 
income behavioral responses. For this purpose, we generated a tax calculator module in STATA 
to compare the tax difference after applying proposed scenarios. The income tax burden was 
calculated as the income tax liability divided by total reported income. The tax difference 
captures the number of winners, which are taxpayers with fewer income tax liabilities after the 
proposed scenario, and the number of losers, defined as taxpayers who suffer from more income 
tax liabilities after the proposed scenario.  
Granell-Perez et al. (2006) conducted a static microsimulation in Spanish regions and 
defined an interactive module on STATA for estimating the change in the distribution of income 
tax burden under their proposed scenarios. For comparison, we also simulate proposed scenarios 
using a static microsimulation process that excludes income behavioral response. The static 
simulation using the proposed scenario follows the same process as the simulation for the base 
year. The static simulation also gives results on liabilities, distribution of burden, and winners 
and losers. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this chapter we present all the results obtained from the empirical analysis. The first 
section presents results from the DID model, the second section presents results on labor supply 
elasticity and reporting income elasticity, and the third section presents the results of the 
microsimulation. The last part of this chapter is a conclusion of the overall empirical results. 
 
Modified Difference-in-Difference (DID) 
DID models use data before and after a policy change that occurs in one period of time 
and affects one group and not another. The objective is to compare the response of the affected 
group relative to that of the unaffected group following a change in policy. In a case of tax 
reform, all income groups are exogenously affected by the change in tax rate, but there are some 
differences in the magnitude of the change. In this dissertation we use a modified DID model in 
which taxpayers in all income groups are affected by the change in tax policy, but we can still 
create a control group, containing taxpayers who are less affected relative to other income 
groups, and a treatment group, which is the income group most affected by the change in 
marginal tax rate. 
Previous literature on DID suggests that income groups that experienced larger 
reductions in their marginal tax rates in the presence of income tax report more of their income 
relative to income groups that are less affected (Alm and Wallace 2000). Martinez-Vazquez et al. 
(2006) used a DID to estimate the impact of tax reform in Russia on net-of-tax wage. This was 
also a modified DID in which all income groups were affected by the tax reform, but the 
treatment groups were different across income groups.  
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The hypothesis for the modified DID model is that, on average, taxpayers in the treatment 
group report more of their income relative to taxpayers in the control group. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the treatment group is the income group that experienced larger reductions in 
their MTR relative to the control group. The dependent variable for the DID model is taxpayers’ 
reported wage income. The DID coefficient is the interaction between a time-specific dummy for 
years after the reform and a dummy for the income treatment group. The independent variable 
includes a dummy for years after 2000, a dummy for the income treatment group, the interaction 
variable or DID estimator, marital status, and number of dependents. The DID model controls for 
exogenous shocks that occur because of a change in policy. For the purposes of this model, we 
assumed that macroeconomics shocks affect all taxpayers in the same way, while the change in 
tax policy yields different effects on taxpayers in different income groups.  
In the modified DID model we present pairs of years 1998/2006, 1999/2006, 1998/2005, 
and 1999/2005.Recall that 1998 and 1999 are years before the tax change, and 2005 and 2006 are 
years after the tax change in 2000. We use the two highest income groups as the control group. 
The highest income group (income above IDR 200 million) was least affected by the change in 
marginal tax rate and also experienced an increase in their marginal tax rate, while the second-
highest income group (income between IDR 100 million and IDR 200 million) was least affected 
by the change and experienced a reduction in their marginal tax rate. The treatment group is the 
income group most affected by the change in marginal tax rate (income between IDR 50 million 
and IDR 100 million). We also constructed a treatment group that consisted of all taxpayers 
earning less than IDR 100 million and who all experienced a larger reduction in their marginal 
tax rate compared to the control group.  
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 Table 3. Modified Difference-in-Difference Result, Control Group Income > IDR 100 Million and <= IDR 200 Million 
Year 1998/2006 1999/2006 1998/2005 1999/2005 
Independent  Treatment Group 
Variables 50m−100m <100m 50m−100m <100m 50m−100m <100m 50m−100m <100m 
DID 
coefficient 3.98e+06*** 6.51e+06*** 3.98e+06*** 6.51e+06*** 1.64e+06*** 9.07e+07*** 2.58e+06*** 5.38e+06*** 
 (135595) (114033) (135595) (114033) (422205) (522325) (126207) (106174) 
Married -298061*** 2.08e+06*** -298061*** 2.08e+06*** 7.60e+06*** 4.15e+06*** -565719*** 1.92e+06*** 
 (-67878) (15691) (67878) (15691) (104075) (92458) (68012) (15641) 
Dependents -863433*** 1.50e+06*** -863433*** 1.50e+06*** 2.38e+06*** 331251*** -732534*** 1.57e+06*** 
 (-22368) (6734) (-22368) (6734) (44718) (39618) (-22438) (6726) 
Constant 1.06e+08*** 1.00e+08*** 1.06e+08*** 1.00e+08*** 1.18e+07*** 2.48e+08*** 1.06e+08*** 1.00e+08*** 
 (62015) (-43557) (62015) (43557) (62640) (202346) (62767) (44286) 
Observations 457943 5494728 457943 5494728 5580243 5580243 457943 5494728 
R-squared 0.71 0.503 0.71 0.503 0.013 0.221 0.708 0.502 
Source: Author's own calculations 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Modified Difference-in-Difference Result, Control Group Income > IDR 200 Million 
Year 1998/2006 1999/2006 1998/2005 1999/2005 
Independent  Treatment Group 
Variables 50m-100m <100m 50m-100m <100m 50m-100m <100m 50m-100m <100m 
DID coefficient 1.38e+08*** 1.41e+08*** 1.38e+08*** 1.41e+08*** 1.39e+08*** 1.42e+08*** 1.39e+08*** 1.42e+08*** 
 (-3870000) (-1030000) (-3870000) (-1030000) (-3250000) (-858925) (-3250000) (-858925) 
Married 2.08e+07*** 3.42e+06*** 2.08e+07*** 3.42e+06*** 1.98e+07*** 3.20e+06*** 1.98e+07*** 3.20e+06*** 
 (-1340000) (-87560) (-1340000) (-87560) (-1330000) (-87131) (-1330000) (-87131) 
Dependents 
-
8540853*** 865199*** 
-
8540853*** 865199*** 
-
8010812*** 967712*** 
-
8010812*** 967712*** 
 (-441889) (-37644) (-441889) (-37644) (-44718) (-37534) (-441443) (-37534) 
Constant 4.37e+08*** 4.37e+08*** 4.37e+08*** 4.37e+08*** 4.42e+08*** 4.42e+08*** 4.42e+08*** 4.42e+08*** 
 (-1290000) (-276005) (-1290000) (-276005) (-1310000) (-280903) (-1310000) (-280903) 
Observations 421731 5458516 421731 5458516 421731 5458516 421731 5458516 
R-squared 0.243 0.321 0.243 0.321 0.244 0.322 0.244 0.322 
Source: Author's own calculations 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The current income tax law was implemented in January 2001. Table 3 shows the DID 
result for control-group income between IDR 100 million ($11,111) and IDR 200 million 
($22,222). The first column shows results for 1998/2006 where the treatment group is income 
between IDR 50 million ($5,556) and IDR 100 million ($11,111). The DID coefficient shows 
that, holding other things constant, taxpayers who experienced a larger reduction in the 
marginal tax rate (treatment group) increased reporting income by IDR 3,980,000 ($442) 
relative to the control group. Being married decreased the amount of reporting income by 
taxpayers in the treatment group by IDR 298,061 ($33) relative to those in the control group, 
and as the number of dependents increases, taxpayers in the treatment group reduced the 
amount of their reporting income by IDR 863,433 ($96). For the treatment group below IDR 
100 million, the DID coefficient shows that, holding other things constant, taxpayers in the 
treatment group report more of their income by IDR 6,510,000 ($723) relative to the control 
group. Being married and having more dependents for this treatment group also increased the 
amount of reporting income relative to the control group. The result for 1999/2006 shows the 
same number as that for 1998/2006. For the same control group, we also estimated 1998/2005 
where the DID coefficient shows a positive and statistically significant number. The results 
show that, holding other things constant, taxpayers in the treatment group reported more of 
their income by IDR 1,640,000 ($182) relative to the control group. Being married also 
increased the reporting income of taxpayers in the income group between IDR 50 million and 
IDR 100 million by IDR 7,600,000 ($844) relative to the control group, and having more 
dependents increased reporting income by IDR 2,380,000 ($264). The last two columns show 
results for 1999/2005, which gave a different result from 1998/2005. The DID coefficient for 
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the income group below IDR 100 million shows that on average, taxpayers in the treatment 
group increased the amount of their reporting income by IDR 5,380,000 ($598).  
Table 4 shows the DID result for the control group above IDR 200 million. The first 
column shows that, holding other things constant, the treatment group reported more of their 
income by IDR 138,000,000 ($15,333) relative to the control group. This number is greater 
than the DID coefficient for the control group between IDR 100 million and IDR 200 million. 
The control group for this DID is the income group above IDR 200 million, which 
experienced an increase in their marginal tax rate. The highest income group is the only 
income group that experienced an increase in their marginal tax rate after the income tax 
reform in 2000. Their marginal tax rate increased from 30 percent to 35 percent. In the second 
column of Table 4, the DID coefficient is IDR 141,000,000 ($15,667), which suggests that 
taxpayers in income groups below IDR 100 million ($11,111) report more of their income 
relative to the highest income group. Being married increased reporting income by taxpayers 
in the treatment group by IDR 20,800,000 ($2,311) relative to the control group, and having 
more dependents reduced the amount of reporting income by taxpayers in the treatment group 
by IDR 8,540,853 ($949) relative to the control group. The result for 1999/2006 is the same as 
the result for 1998/2006. The DID coefficient for 1998/2005 in Table 4 shows that, on 
average, holding other things constant, the treatment group below IDR 100 million reported 
more of their income by IDR 142,000,000 ($15,778) relative to the control group. For the 
same treatment group, the DID coefficient for 1999/2005 shows the same number. Being 
married increased the decision of taxpayers in the treatment group to report more of their 
income, while having more dependents reduced the reporting income of taxpayers in the 
treatment group relative to the control group.  
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The overall DID results from Tables 3 and 4 supports the hypothesis that, on average, 
income groups that experienced larger reductions in MTR reported more of their income 
relative to those who were less affected. Our modified DID estimation in this dissertation is to 
estimate the interaction variable between the dummy for the treatment group times the 
dummy for the year after the reform. The objective of this model is to estimate the reporting 
behavioral response of taxpayers in the treatment group relative to that of the control group. 
Including individual specific variables, such as marital status and number of dependents, the 
result of the DID coefficient is still positive and statistically significant. Different effects 
across income groups allow us to use a modified DID model to analyze the effects of the 
change in MTR before and after 2000.  
To estimate the reporting elasticity of taxpayers before and after 2000, we did not use 
the DID model because the DID estimation compares the impact of income tax reform on 
affected and least affected income groups, while the reporting income elasticity that we want 
to use for our microsimulation purposes includes elasticities for all taxpayers. Another reason 
for not calculating reporting income elasticity from the DID model is that the nature of the 
taxpayer dataset that we have is an independent cross-section without any information on 
taxpayers’ identities. We estimate the response of taxpayers by comparing between income 
groups instead of comparing individual taxpayers. 
 
 
Elasticity Results 
The elasticity results in this dissertation present labor supply elasticity from the socio-
economic household survey data (Susenas) and reporting elasticity from the income tax return 
data. The labor/leisure choice model in the theoretical chapter shows the ambiguity of labor 
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supply decision with respect to a change in marginal tax rate. Empirical results of labor 
supply elasticity provide evidence to support the theoretical model. Recall, Rochjadi and 
Leuthold (1994) found that labor supply elasticity in Indonesia to range from -0.2 to -0.6 for 
the uncompensated elasticities and from 0.33 to 0.58 for compensated elasticities.18 These 
elasticities are small but still comparable to labor supply elasticities in developed countries.  
Table 5. Labor Supply Elasticity 2004, by Income Group 
Income Group Elasticity 
1 -0.05 
2 -0.22 
3 -0.2 
4 -1.05 
Source: Author's own calculations 
Table 5 presents labor supply elasticities by income group. We estimate the change in 
number of yearly hours worked with respect to the change in marginal tax rate. The data for 
the elasticities are from the household survey data (Susenas) for 2004. We created four 
income groups based on tax bracket.19 The elasticity results in Table 5 show that the lowest 
income group is the least responsive among the income groups, while the highest income 
group is the most responsive to the change in marginal tax rate. The overall labor supply 
elasticity for 2004 ranged from -0.05 to -1.05. The elasticity for low-income groups is very 
small given that we used data on taxpayers who have a very limited ability to change their 
number of hours worked when the marginal tax rate changes. On the other hand, the labor 
supply elasticity for the highest income group is relatively large, -1.05, compared to other 
                                                 
18
 Note that compensated elasticity takes into account the change in income, while uncompensated elasticity does 
not take into account the change in income. Our elasticities are the totals from household survey data and income 
tax return data.  
 
19
 There are five income tax brackets under current law, but we created only four income groups since there are 
no observations for the income group above IDR 200 million ($22,222.22). 
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income groups. Previous studies on labor supply elasticity in Indonesia excluded employees 
and laborers from the estimation regarding the rigidity in number of hours worked.20 We also 
calculated reporting income elasticities by income groups for 2004; results ranged as follows: 
1.4 for the lowest income group, 0.76 for the income group between IDR 25 million ($2,778) 
and IDR 50 million (5,556), 0.63 for the income group between IDR 50 million and IDR 100 
million (11,111), and 0.9 for the highest income group. The reporting elasticities are all bigger 
than the labor supply elasticity. The decision of taxpayers to report their income is a broader 
decision and more responsive to the change in marginal tax rate.  
Table 6. Total Labor Supply Elasticity 
  Employee/Laborer All Types of Jobs 
  1999 2004 1999 2004 
 
Elasticity -0.1 -0.2 -0.27 -0.78 
Source: Author's own calculations  
 
Table 6 shows elasticities of employees and laborers for 1999 and 2004.21 For 
employees or laborers, the elasticity for 1999 and 2004 was smaller than the labor supply 
elasticity for the same years for all types of jobs, given that employees and laborers do not 
have much control over their number of hours worked. The total reporting income elasticity 
for 1999 was 0.02, which is very small compared to the labor supply elasticity for the same 
year. For 2004, the reporting income elasticity was 1.34, which was larger than the labor 
supply elasticity. The labor supply and reporting income elasticities were smaller for 1999 
under the previous law, which had a higher marginal tax rate than the current one. Under 
                                                 
20
 See Rochjadi and Leuthold (1994) for more information on their labor supply elasticity estimation. 
 
21
 Susenas only provides income modules every two or three years. The income module contains information on 
household wages and expenditures. The Susenas data that we have are for 1998−2004. The income module is 
available for 1999, 2002, and 2004.   
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current law, the elasticities are larger, even though some income groups experienced large 
reductions in MTR, because the highest income group suffered from an increase in their 
marginal tax rate from 30 percent to 35 percent.  
Comparing labor elasticity and reporting elasticity results, we conclude that changes in 
marginal tax rate reduce the amount of labor supply but increase the amount of reporting 
income.22 These results support the elasticities results found by Rochjadi and Leuthold 
(1994), which was negative for labor supply uncompensated elasticity, without taking into 
account changes in income. The reporting income elasticities for 1999 and 2004 were 
positive, which suggests that an increase in marginal tax rate increased the compliance 
decision. Tax enforcement programs by the central government and tax authorities are one 
reason for the increase in compliance over time.   
For the dynamic microsimulation model, we used reporting income elasticities. The 
dynamic microsimulation in this dissertation is a dynamic income behavior simulation. The 
elasticity is calculated from income tax return reporting. We calculate the elasticity rate from 
the percentage change in taxable income with respect to the percentage change in marginal 
tax rate. Compared to the elasticities results from the survey data, reporting income elasticities 
are relatively larger. The labor supply elasticities for 1999 and 2004 from the survey data 
show smaller results, ranging from -1.05 to -0.05, as compared to reporting elasticities from 
the income tax return data for 1998 and 2006, which ranged from -1.77 to 0.4. As suggested 
by previous literature on labor supply elasticities and reporting income elasticities, both 
results show that high-income groups are more elastic compared to lower-income groups.  
 
                                                 
 
22
 Note that our elasticities result on labor supply shows negative sign, and results on reporting income are 
positive. 
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Table 7. Taxable Income Elasticity 1998 and 2006, by Income Groups 
Income Group Elasticity 
1 0.21 
2 0.40 
3 0.26 
4 0.27 
5 0.20 
6 0.18 
7 0.32 
8 0.28 
9 -0.10 
10 -1.77 
Source: Author's own calculations 
 
Table 7 shows reporting income elasticity for 1998 and 2006. The elasticity varies 
from -1.77 for elasticity on the highest income group to 0.4 for the second-lowest income 
group. These elasticities are smaller than results achieved by Alm and Wallace (2007) using a 
cross-section of data for the United States in 1995. They obtained reporting income 
elasticities from -1.53 to -3.69 for three different income types. Previous literature shows that 
the elasticity of taxable income varies around the world. Hansson (2004) found the elasticity 
of taxable income in Sweden to range from 0.4 to 0.5. Kopczuk (2004) found elasticity 
ranging from 0.088 to 0.156 and also stated that higher-income groups are more responsive 
than lower-income groups. Thomas (2007) found elasticity in New Zealand ranging from 0.35 
to 1.1. Our elasticity results are comparable to those elasticities from previous studies. The 
highest income group has the highest elasticity, meaning that taxpayers in the highest income 
group are more responsive to the change in MTR compared to those in the lower income 
group, with elasticity close to zero.  
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Microsimulation Results 
 
Static and Dynamic Microsimulation 
 
The microsimulation model in this dissertation was designed to address government 
income tax revenues from withholding income under current and proposed scenarios, to 
estimate the distribution of income tax burden among income groups, and to discuss the 
number of winners and losers under each proposed scenario. We proposed several scenarios 
that were discussed by the tax authorities for the near future income tax amendment, and we 
also propose a flat income tax scenario. The static microsimulation does not take into account 
reporting response by taxpayers. The dynamic behavior microsimulation includes reporting 
income elasticity into the tax calculator. We are expecting different results between static and 
dynamic behavior microsimulations given the inclusion of reporting income elasticity.  
In the following subsection we present the proposed scenarios and microsimulation 
results, including results for income tax liabilities, which represent government income tax 
collection from withholding income; the income tax burden across income groups, defined as 
income tax liability divided by total reporting income; and the change in tax liabilities, 
calculated as the new liability (liability under proposed scenario) minus the current liability 
(liability under current law). Winners under each scenario are taxpayers with reductions in tax 
liabilities, which will have a negative calculation on the tax change, while losers are taxpayers 
with an increase in tax liability, which will have a positive calculation on the tax change.   
Scenario I 
In this scenario we change the MTR and reduce the number of income groups from 
five to four. The personal exemptions stay the same.  
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Table 8. Current and Proposed Scenario I Marginal Tax Rate, by Income Group23 
Current MTR Proposed MTR 
Income Group MTR Income Group MTR 
<=25m($2,777.78) 5% <=50m($5,555.56) 5% 
>25m<=50m($5,555.56) 10% >50m<=100m($11,111) 15% 
>50m<=100m($11,111) 15% >100m<=200m($22,222.22) 25% 
>100m<=200m($22,222.22) 25% >200m 35% 
>200m 35%     
Source: Directorate General of Taxation (2007), all in million rupiahs 
 
Table 8 shows that the proposed scenario is slightly different from the current MTR. 
The second-lowest income group under current law is diminished into one income group with 
a statutory MTR of 5 percent. The rest of the income groups are not affected by the change in 
MTR. This scenario is expected to attract more taxpayers in the low-middle-income group 
with taxable income between IDR 25 million ($2,778) and IDR 50 million ($5,556) to comply 
with tax-compliance rules. In the income tax return dataset, most taxpayers are either in the 
lowest or in the second-lowest income group. Based on this fact, another purpose of this 
scenario is to ease the burden of lower-middle-income taxpayers. We expect that the 
distribution of income tax burden under this scenario will be slightly different from the 
current scenario and that diminishing one income group will reduce the total amount of 
government income tax revenue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 See Chapter I for personal exemptions under current law. Under the first proposed scenario, we use the same 
personal exemptions as current law. The proposed marginal tax rate was quoted from the Directorate General of 
Taxation’s website available at www.pajak.go.id, accessed on 23 November 2007. 
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Table 9. Static Microsimulation: Sum, Percentage Sum of Income Tax Liabilities, and Mean 
Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario 
 
Table 9 presents static microsimulation results for the base scenario and scenario I. 
The results show that, under scenario I, all income groups experienced reduction on their 
nominal income tax liabilities, but the share of income tax liabilities for income groups 1, 2, 
9, and 10 are more under this scenario. Government income tax collection loss under scenario 
I shows a significant number, from IDR 1, 973 billion ($219 million) to IDR 1, 466 billion 
($162 million). The income tax burden for all income groups was slightly reduced compared 
to the current scenario. Under this set of scenarios, diminishing one income tax bracket eases 
the burden for all income groups by a small amount, but the drawback is significant loss of 
government income tax revenue. There are some taxpayers that suffer from paying more 
income taxes (losers) for the two lowest income groups under this scenario. There are 108, 
296 losers and 547, 298 winners in the lowest income group and 2, 779 losers and 109, 208 
Income Base Scenario Scenario I 
 Sum  PctSum Mean  Sum  PctSum Mean  
Group Liabilities (%) Burden Liabilities (%) Burden 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.01 134,001,139,652 9.14 0.01 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.04 99,255,792,051 6.77 0.03 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.06 82,224,658,274 5.61 0.04 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.08 57,883,290,248 3.95 0.04 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.11 96,887,541,567 6.61 0.06 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.14 95,084,250,845 6.49 0.08 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.18 140,669,947,654 9.59 0.11 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.23 100,424,732,280 6.85 0.15 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.26 130,012,188,124 8.87 0.19 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.30 529,669,766,904 36.13 0.27 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.03 1,466,113,307,598 100.00 0.02 
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winners in the second-lowest income group.24 The total number of winners under this scenario 
is larger than the total number of losers. This scenario does not ease the burden of lower-
income groups because some taxpayers in the first and second income groups are considered 
losers.  
Table 10. Dynamic Behavior Microsimulation: Sum, Percentage Sum of Income Tax 
Liabilities, and Mean Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario I 
Income Base Scenario Scenario I 
Group Liabilities Burden Liabilities Burden 
  Sum PctSum(%) Mean Sum PctSum(%) Mean 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.014 1.48071E+11 12.28 0.015 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.039 79,404,633,636 6.58 0.026 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.062 75,169,782,592 6.23 0.034 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.082 52,725,889,097 4.37 0.037 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.106 77,356,786,166 6.41 0.045 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.143 81,156,368,321 6.73 0.069 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.177 126,091,032,144 10.45 0.100 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.225 93,210,144,404 7.73 0.141 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.258 126,309,462,760 10.47 0.186 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.303 346,733,618,192 28.75 0.169 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.03 1,206,228,976,634 100.00 0.022 
 
Table 10 shows that taking into account taxpayers' income reporting behavior yields a 
larger reduction in the total government income tax collection as compared to the static 
microsimulation. The total government income tax collection loss under this scenario is IDR 
766 billion ($ 85 million).25 The share of income tax burden for the lowest income group is 
1.5 percent, which is slightly higher than under the current scenario, while the share of 
income tax burden for other income groups reduced under this scenario as compared to the 
                                                 
24
 See Appendix C4 
 
25
 See Table 24. 
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current scenario. There are no winners for the lowest income group under this scenario. All 
winners (246,749) from this scenario are from income groups two through ten, while all 
taxpayers in income group 1 are losers.26 The total number of losers was greater than the 
number of winners in this scenario, with the lowest-income group paying more of the income 
tax burden. Overall, this scenario is considered regressive and less equitable, and it generates 
a large amount of government revenue loss.  
Scenario II 
This scenario proposes the same marginal tax rate as Scenario I, with a change in the 
personal exemptions rate.  
Table 11. Proposed Scenario II Marginal Tax Rate and Exemptions, by Income Group27 
Proposed Exemptions Proposed MTR 
 Exemptions Income groups MTR 
For each taxpayer  IDR 39.6 million ($4,400) <=50 million ($5,556) 5% 
Additional married IDR 3.6 million ($400) >50million<=100million ($11,111) 15% 
Additional for married 
woman with unrelated 
job with her spouse 
IDR 39.6 million ($4,400) >100 million<=200 million ($22,222) 25% 
Additional for each 
dependents IDR 3.6 million ($400) >200 million 35% 
Source: Directorate General of Taxation (2007) 
 
In this scenario, we impose an increase in personal exemption by three times the 
current rate. We increase the personal exemptions to ease the burden of lower-income groups. 
Under this scenario, it is expected that the distribution of burden will shift to higher-income 
groups. The drawback of this scenario is that government income tax collection will be 
reduced by a greater amount than under scenario I.  
                                                 
26
 See Table 25 at the end of this section. 
 
27
 See Chapter I for personal exemptions under current law. Under the first proposed scenario, we use the same 
personal exemptions as current law. The proposed marginal tax rate was quoted from the Directorate General of 
Taxation’s website, www.pajak.go.id, accessed on 23 November 2007. 
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Table 12. Static Microsimulation: Sum, Percentage Sum of Income Tax Liabilities, and Mean 
Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario II 
Income Base Scenario Scenario II 
 Sum Liabilities PctSum Mean  Sum Liabilities PctSum Mean  
Group Liabilities (%) Burden Liabilities (%) Burden 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.01 0 0.00 0.00 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.04 11,912,803,121 1.17 0.00 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.06 36,180,990,973 3.57 0.02 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.08 34,522,539,488 3.40 0.02 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.11 53,037,015,222 5.23 0.03 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.14 63,120,031,186 6.22 0.05 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.18 103,360,797,008 10.18 0.08 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.23 84,449,483,950 8.32 0.13 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.26 114,155,181,476 11.25 0.17 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.30 514,110,277,288 50.66 0.26 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.030 1,014,849,119,711 100.00 0.006 
 
In the static microsimulation for scenario II, government income tax revenue reduced 
by a significant amount. The total income tax revenue loss under this scenario is the largest 
compared to the other scenarios. The share of income tax liabilities borne by the highest-
income group increased by a significant rate, from 28.96 percent to 50.66 percent. The 
income tax burden shifted to middle- and high-income groups, while lower-income groups 
bear almost none of the income tax burden under this scenario. All income groups are winners 
under this scenario, which means that all taxpayers pay fewer taxes. The increase in personal 
exemptions by three times of the current rate is considered very large and will affect the 
government income tax collection by a greater amount compared to scenario I. 
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Table 13. Dynamic Behavior Microsimulation: Sum, Percentage Sum of Income Tax 
Liabilities, and Mean Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario II 
Income Base Scenario Scenario II 
Group Liabilities Burden Liabilities Burden 
  Sum PctSum(%) Mean Sum PctSum(%) Mean 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.014 0 0.00 0 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.039 9,530,242,497 1.21 0.003 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.062 33,076,661,943 4.19 0.015 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.082 31,446,581,210 3.98 0.022 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.106 46,181,618,061 5.84 0.027 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.143 52,068,928,343 6.59 0.044 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.177 93,201,867,889 11.79 0.074 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.225 77,981,898,684 9.87 0.117 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.258 110,975,930,980 14.04 0.163 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.303 335,776,174,592 42.49 0.16 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.03 790,239,904,198 100.00 0.005 
 
Table 13 shows that, under the reporting behavior microsimulation, increasing 
personal exemptions by three times the current rate generates a very large reduction in total 
government revenue—only IDR 790 billion ($ 87 million). The total government revenue loss 
is IDR 1,182 billion ($ 131 million). The lowest-income group is not entitled to any liabilities 
under this scenario, and the share of tax burden for all income groups is very low. The two 
lowest-income groups bear no burden under this scenario. The income tax burden is shifted to 
the two highest-income groups. There are no losers under this scenario. This scenario eases 
the burden of lower-income groups. Greatly increasing personal exemptions while keeping 
the same marginal tax rate for all income groups yields a very large governmental revenue 
loss but has the advantage of shifting the income tax burden to higher-income groups. As 
mentioned in the introduction, income-tax revenue contributes the largest amount to the total 
government revenue from taxation. Implementing this scenario would generate a very large 
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reduction in total government revenue. The drawback of this scenario is the trade-off between 
government revenue and income tax burden.  
Scenario III 
This scenario proposes a similar marginal tax rate as in scenario I, except for the 
highest-income group. Under this scenario, the marginal tax rate for the highest-income group 
was reduced from 35 percent to 30 percent. The 10 percent income tax bracket is diminished, 
and the personal exemptions rate is the same as the current rate. 
Table 14. Current and Proposed Scenario III Marginal Tax Rate, by Income Group 
Current MTR Proposed MTR 
Income groups MTR Income groups MTR 
<=25m ($2,777.78) 5% <=50m ($5,555.56) 5% 
>25m<=50m ($5,555.56) 10% >50m<=250m ($27,777.78) 15% 
>50m<=100m ($11,111) 15% >250m<=500m ($55,555.56) 25% 
>100m<=200m ($22,222.22) 25% >500m 30% 
>200m 35%     
Source: Directorate General of Taxation (2007), all in million rupiahs 
 
The reason for reducing the MTR for the highest-income group is to make the rate 
comparable with the corporate income tax rate. Considering the current MTR for corporate 
income tax ranges between 10 percent and 30 percent, the highest marginal tax rate was 
reduced to 30 percent to avoid income shifting.28 Another reason for decreasing the highest 
marginal tax rate is to improve the reporting decision among the affluent. Without any 
changes in the personal exemptions rate, it is expected that the total amount of government 
income tax collection under this scenario will be reduced by a less significant amount as 
compared to scenario II. 
                                                 
28
 Note that there is a possibility of a flat 30 percent corporate income tax rate implemented at the same time as 
the new marginal tax rate for individual income tax. 
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Table 15. Static Microsimulation: Sum, Percentage Sum of Income Tax Liabilities, and Mean 
Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario III 
Income Base Scenario Scenario III 
 Sum Liabilities PctSum Mean  Sum Liabilities PctSum Mean  
Group Liabilities (%) Burden Liabilities (%) Burden 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.01 134,001,139,652 10.49 0.01 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.04 99,255,792,051 7.77 0.03 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.06 82,224,658,274 6.44 0.04 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.08 57,883,290,248 4.53 0.04 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.11 96,887,541,567 7.59 0.06 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.14 95,084,250,845 7.45 0.08 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.18 122,305,968,580 9.58 0.10 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.23 74,618,839,382 5.84 0.11 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.26 89,085,836,586 6.98 0.13 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.30 425,496,183,480 33.32 0.21 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.030 1,276,843,500,664 100.00 0.022 
 
Under this scenario, the total income tax liabilities reduced from IDR 1,973 billion 
($219 million) to IDR 1,276 billion ($ 141 million). The percentage share of income tax 
liabilities for the two lowest-income groups increases from 6.79 percent to 10.49 percent and 
from 6.17 percent to 7.77 percent, respectively. Similar to scenario I, this scenario contains 
losers in the two lowest-income groups.29 Under this scenario, the income tax burden for 
high-income groups was reduced by a significant rate.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 See Appendix C4. 
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Table 16. Dynamic Behavior Microsimulation: Sum, Percentage Sum of Income Tax 
Liabilities, and Mean Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario III 
Income Base Scenario Scenario III 
Group Liabilities Burden Liabilities Burden 
  Sum PctSum(%) Mean Sum PctSum(%) Mean 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.014 1.48071E+11 14.03 0.015 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.039 79,404,633,636 7.52 0.026 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.062 75,169,782,592 7.12 0.034 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.082 52,725,889,097 5.00 0.037 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.106 77,356,786,166 7.33 0.045 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.143 81,156,368,321 7.69 0.069 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.177 113,237,950,367 10.73 0.091 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.225 70,290,086,590 6.66 0.106 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.258 86,593,125,506 8.21 0.128 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.303 271,229,917,448 25.70 0.124 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.03 1,055,235,799,045 100.00 0.022 
 
Table 16 shows that the lowest-income group bears more income tax liabilities under 
this scenario as compared to the current scenario. As in scenario I, changing the marginal tax 
rate without changing the current personal exemptions yields a revenue loss, and the lowest 
income group is the only group that suffers from higher income tax liabilities. The lowest 
income group bears 14.03 percent of the total income tax liabilities as compared to 6.79 
percent under the current scenario. Under this scenario, the largest share of income tax burden 
is borne by income groups 7, 8, 9, and 10. Overall, the share of income tax burden for all 
income groups reduced, except for the lowest-income group. There are no winners in the 
lowest-income group. All taxpayers in the lowest-income group pay more income tax liability 
under this scenario. The total government revenue loss is greater as compared to scenario I, 
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given that under this scenario the marginal tax rate for the highest-income group reduced from 
35 percent to 30 percent.  
Scenario IV 
This scenario proposes the same marginal tax rate as Scenario III. In this scenario, 
there is a 20 percent increase in the personal exemptions rate. Personal exemptions are not 
indexed to inflation. The inflation rate in Indonesia was around 7.37 percent as of June 2008, 
an increase of 20 percent in the personal exemptions rate is considered suitable.30  
Table 17. Proposed Scenario IV Marginal Tax Rate and Exemptions, by Income Group 
Proposed Exemptions Proposed MTR 
 Exemptions Income Group MTR 
For each taxpayer  IDR 15.84 million ($1,760) <=50million ($5,556) 5% 
Additional married IDR 1.44 million ($160) >50million<=250million ($27,778) 15% 
Additional for married 
woman with unrelated 
job from her spouse 
IDR 15.84 million($1,760) >250million<=500million ($55,556) 25% 
Additional for each 
dependent IDR 1.44 million ($160) >500million 30% 
 
This scenario is based on the planned scenario by the tax authorities. By increasing the 
personal exemptions rate, it is expected that the distribution of income tax burden will shift to 
higher-income groups. This scenario will be implemented in the near future as the new 
individual income tax law.31 The drawback of this scenario is that the increase in personal 
exemption plus the reduction in the highest marginal tax rate will reduce income tax 
collection and government revenue from individual income tax. 
                                                 
30
 Indonesian Statistical Bureau, http://www.bps.go.id/sector/cpi/table1.shtml  Accessed July, 2008 
 
31
 See the announcement from the Directorate General of Taxation, 
http://www.pajak.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7026:Siaran%20Pers%20RUU%20P
Ph&catid=89:pressrelease&Itemid=174. Accessed July 21, 2008. 
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Table 18. Static Microsimulation: Sum, Percentage Sum of Income Tax Liabilities, and Mean 
Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario IV 
Income Base Scenario Scenario IV 
 Sum  PctSum Mean  Sum  PctSum Mean  
Group Liabilities (%) Burden Liabilities (%) Burden 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.01 88,617,518,080 7.38 0.01 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.04 89,846,884,155 7.49 0.03 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.06 77,620,293,177 6.47 0.04 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.08 55,547,215,997 4.63 0.04 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.11 90,876,423,484 7.57 0.05 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.14 91,887,826,579 7.66 0.08 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.18 119,768,862,310 9.98 0.10 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.23 73,660,325,044 6.14 0.11 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.26 88,024,999,536 7.33 0.13 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.30 424,218,250,320 35.35 0.21 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.030 1,200,068,598,681 100.00 0.018 
 
Under scenario IV, the total income tax liability is reduced by IDR 773 billion ($85 
million). The share of income tax liability for lower-income groups is increased, although the 
sum of income tax liability for each income group is reduced. The income tax burden under 
this scenario is more equally distributed. The high-income groups experience a large 
reduction in their income tax burden. Implementing this scenario would reduce the 
government income tax collection but would ease the burden of all income groups. 
Comparing this scenario with scenario III, high-income groups bear more of the burden owing 
to an increase in the personal exemption rate by 20 percent, even though there is also a 
reduction in this group's marginal tax rate.  
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Table 19. Dynamic Behavior Microsimulation: Sum, Percentage Sum of Income Tax 
Liabilities, and Mean Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario IV 
Income Base Scenario Scenario IV 
Group Liabilities Burden Liabilities Burden 
  Sum PctSum(%) Mean Sum PctSum(%) Mean 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.014 97922357474 10.00 0.009 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.039 71,877,507,320 7.34 0.023 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.062 70,960,472,021 7.25 0.032 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.082 50,597,959,066 5.17 0.035 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.106 73,100,484,385 7.47 0.043 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.143 78,247,622,119 7.99 0.067 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.177 110,836,427,096 11.32 0.089 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.225 69,376,392,544 7.09 0.105 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.258 85,495,022,212 8.74 0.126 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.303 270,347,588,064 27.62 0.123 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.03 978,761,832,301 100.00 0.017 
 
Table 19 shows that implementing scenario IV yields a total income tax liability of 
IDR 978 billion ($ 109 million). The total government revenue loss under the dynamic 
behavior microsimulation is IDR 994 billion ($104 million). Income groups 1, 2, and 3 bear 
the larger share of the income tax burden under this scenario as compared to in the current 
scenario. The share of income tax liability borne by the lowest-income group under this 
scenario is 10 percent, while under the current scenario it is only 6.79 percent. The income tax 
burden was reduced for all income groups. Income groups 8, 9, and 10 bear 35.4 percent of 
the income tax burden. This scenario will be implemented in the near future as the fourth 
amendment of income tax law no. 7/1983. The benefit of implementing this scenario is the 
progressivity of income tax burden across income groups. There are no losers under this 
scenario. All taxpayers are winners meaning that under this scenario taxpayer are given less 
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income tax liability. There is an anomaly under this scenario; although all income groups are 
winners, the share of income tax liability for lower-income groups is higher under this 
scenario as compared to the current scenario. The drawback in this scenario is the significant 
reduction in total government revenue. Increasing the personal exemptions rate by 20 percent, 
while reducing the marginal tax rate for the highest-income group, is expected to encourage 
taxpayers to report more of their income and to consume more.  
Scenario V 
This scenario is a flat income tax scenario. In this scenario we increase the personal 
exemption three times from the current exemption and set a flat rate of 25 percent for all 
income groups. Individual income tax has always been progressive in Indonesia, but the 
corporate income tax was once a flat rate.  
Table 20. Proposed Scenario V Marginal Tax Rate 
Proposed Exemptions and MTR 
Income Group  Exemptions MTR 
All Income 
Groups 
Single IDR 39.6 million($4,400) 25% 
 
Additional married IDR 3.6 million($400) 
 
Additional for married woman with unrelated job from 
her spouse IDR 39.6 million ($4,400) 
 
Additional for each dependent IDR 3.6 milion ($400), 
max 3 dependents 
 
 
It is expected that under a flat rate with high personal exemption the income tax 
burden on lower-income groups will be shifted to higher-income groups. A flat individual 
income tax rate is not popular in developing countries like Indonesia. In terms of tax 
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liabilities, imposing a flat rate on all income groups is expected to ease the liabilities for high-
income groups as compared to the current rate.  
Table 21. Static Microsimulation: Sum and Percentage Sum of Income Tax Liabilities and 
Mean Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario V 
Income Base Scenario Scenario V 
 Sum  PctSum Mean  Sum  PctSum Mean  
Group Liabilities (%) Burden Liabilities (%) Burden 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.01 0 0.00 0.00 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.04 59,564,015,610 3.25 0.02 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.06 180,904,954,870 9.88 0.08 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.08 172,612,697,397 9.43 0.12 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.11 255,342,903,849 13.95 0.15 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.14 204,650,051,949 11.18 0.18 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.18 240,524,866,026 13.14 0.19 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.23 138,314,483,950 7.56 0.21 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.26 147,641,345,992 8.07 0.22 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.30 430,946,625,240 23.54 0.24 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.030 1,830,501,944,883 100.00 0.021 
 
Under this scenario, total income tax liabilities reduced the least as compared to other 
scenarios. Middle-income groups bear more of the burden than in the current scenario. The 
share of income tax liability for income groups 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 increased, and the income tax 
burden for these income groups also increased. These income groups are the losers, while 
other income groups are winners. Middle-income groups bear the burden of a flat income tax 
scenario. This scenario yields more income tax revenue for the government, but the 
distribution of burden under this scenario is less equitable as compared to other scenarios. 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
 
Table 22. Dynamic Behavior Microsimulation: Sum, Percentage Sum of Income Tax 
Liabilities, and Mean Income Tax Burden Base Scenario and Scenario V 
Income Base Scenario Scenario V 
Group Liabilities Burden Liabilities Burden 
  Sum PctSum(%) Mean Sum PctSum(%) Mean 
1 134,001,139,628 6.79 0.014 0 0.00 0 
2 121,800,576,458 6.17 0.039 47,651,212,483 2.99 0.014 
3 135,998,556,580 6.89 0.062 165,383,309,774 10.37 0.075 
4 117,963,406,663 5.98 0.082 157,232,906,054 9.86 0.109 
5 181,027,961,028 9.17 0.106 229,808,613,455 14.41 0.135 
6 167,264,911,746 8.48 0.143 186,231,547,243 11.68 0.160 
7 221,084,367,448 11.20 0.177 227,671,217,148 14.28 0.183 
8 149,046,370,900 7.55 0.225 131,846,898,684 8.27 0.200 
9 173,594,508,740 8.80 0.258 145,175,735,620 9.10 0.216 
10 571,355,070,208 28.96 0.303 303,563,112,068 19.04 0.165 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 100.00 0.030 1,594,564,552,530 100.00 0.019 
 
Table 22 shows that the total income tax liability under a flat tax rate yields the lowest 
government revenue loss as compared to other scenarios. The total government revenue loss 
under this scenario is IDR 378 billion ($42 million). If the personal exemption rate is 
increased by three times the current rate, the lowest-income group bears no liabilities under a 
flat income tax rate. The income tax burden shifts to the middle-income groups. Income 
groups 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 bear more of the burden under this scenario as compared to the current 
scenario. The total number of winners is still greater than the number of losers. There are 
losers in income groups 2 through 7. The burden is not equally distributed. The burden is 
greater for the middle-income groups as compared to high-income groups. The advantage of 
this scenario is that the government would be able to maintain its revenue, given that the 
reduction in income tax liabilities is smaller than as compared to a progressive income tax 
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rate. The drawback of this scenario is that most of the income tax burden is borne by low- and 
middle-income groups, which are also the largest. Thus, implementing a flat tax rate of 25 
percent could make most taxpayers worse off than under the current scenario.  
 
Conclusion 
The microsimulation shows different results between static and dynamic behavior. 
Results for static microsimulations in all scenarios show smaller government revenue losses 
as compared to the dynamic behavior microsimulations.  
The results for both static and dynamic behavioral microsimulations show that 
changing the marginal tax rate or the income tax bracket without any changes in the personal 
exemptions yields a lower government income tax collection loss at a cost of a greater income 
tax burden for lower-income groups. Under scenarios I and III, taxpayers in income group 1 
are all losers, which suggests that these income groups suffer from more income tax liability. 
Increasing the personal exemptions and reducing the marginal tax rate for the highest-income 
group in scenarios II and IV generates greater government income tax collection loss as 
compared to scenarios I and III. Under scenarios II and IV, all income groups are considered 
winners, which imply that taxpayers in all income groups pay less income tax liability. Under 
flat income tax scenario V, the government income tax collection loss is the least as compared 
to other proposed scenarios. The income tax burden under this scenario is shifted to the lower- 
and middle-income groups. Income groups 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are losers under this scenario. 
These income groups suffer from paying more income tax liability under a flat income tax 
scenario.  
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In the near future, the tax authorities will implement scenario IV as the fourth 
amendment to income tax law no. 7/1983. There will be four income tax brackets, personal 
exemptions will increase 20 percent over the current rate, and the marginal tax rate of the 
highest income group will be reduced from 35 percent to 30 percent. Under this scenario, the 
government will suffer from a large income tax revenue loss, but all income groups will be 
better off in terms of sharing the income tax burden. All income groups bear a smaller burden 
under this scenario, but in terms of income tax liability the three lowest-income groups bear 
larger shares of income tax liability. There is a trade-off between government income tax 
collection and the income tax burden. Due to the increase in personal exemptions and the 
reduction in the marginal tax rate of the highest-income group, it is expected that 
implementing this scenario will encourage taxpayers' reporting decision. 
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 Table 23. Static Microsimulation, New Minus Current Tax Liabilities 
Income Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V 
Group Sum PctSum Sum PctSum Sum PctSum Sum PctSum Sum PctSum 
1 24 0.00 -134,001,139,628 13.98 24 0.00 -45,383,621,548 5.87 -134,001,139,628 93.95 
2 -22,544,784,407 4.45 -109,887,773,337 11.47 -22,544,784,407 3.24 -31,953,692,303 4.13 -62,236,560,848 43.63 
3 -53,773,898,306 10.61 -99,817,565,607 10.42 -53,773,898,306 7.72 -58,378,263,403 7.55 44,906,398,290 
-31.48 
4 -60,080,116,415 11.85 -83,440,867,175 8.71 -60,080,116,415 8.63 -62,416,190,666 8.07 54,649,290,734 
-38.31 
5 -84,140,419,461 16.59 -127,990,945,806 13.36 -84,140,419,461 12.08 -90,151,537,544 11.66 74,314,942,821 
-52.10 
6 -72,180,660,901 14.24 -104,144,880,560 10.87 -72,180,660,901 10.37 -75,377,085,167 9.75 37,385,140,203 
-26.21 
7 -80,414,419,794 15.86 -117,723,570,440 12.28 -98,778,398,868 14.19 -101,315,505,138 13.11 19,440,498,578 
-13.63 
8 -48,621,638,620 9.59 -64,596,886,950 6.74 -74,427,531,518 10.69 -75,386,045,856 9.75 -10,731,886,950 7.52 
9 -43,582,320,616 8.60 -59,439,327,264 6.20 -84,508,672,154 12.14 -85,569,509,204 11.07 -25,953,162,748 18.20 
10 -41,685,303,304 8.22 -57,244,792,920 5.97 -145,858,886,728 20.95 -147,136,819,888 19.03 -140,408,444,968 98.44 
Total -507,023,561,800 100.00 -958,287,749,687 100.00 -696,293,368,734 100.00 -773,068,270,717 100.00 -142,634,924,515 100.00 
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Table 24. Dynamic Behavior Microsimulation, New minus Current Tax Liabilities 
 
Income  Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V   
Group Sum  PctSum Sum  PctSum Sum  PctSum Sum  PctSum Sum  PctSum 
1 14,070,119,695 -1.83 -134,001,139,628 11.33 14,070,119,695 -1.53 -36,078,782,154 3.63 -134,001,139,628 35.40 
2 -42,395,942,822 5.53 -112,270,333,961 9.49 -42,395,942,822 4.62 -49,923,069,138 5.02 -74,149,363,975 19.59 
3 -60,828,773,988 7.93 -102,921,894,637 8.70 -60,828,773,988 6.63 -65,038,084,559 6.54 29,384,753,194 -7.76 
4 -65,237,517,566 8.51 -86,516,825,453 7.31 -65,237,517,566 7.11 -67,365,447,597 6.77 39,269,499,391 -10.37 
5 -103,671,174,862 13.52 -134,846,342,967 11.40 -103,671,174,862 11.29 -107,927,476,643 10.85 48,780,652,427 -12.89 
6 -86,108,543,425 11.23 -115,195,983,403 9.74 -86,108,543,425 9.38 -89,017,289,627 8.95 18,966,635,497 -5.01 
7 -94,993,335,304 12.39 -127,882,499,559 10.81 -107,846,417,081 11.75 -110,247,940,352 11.09 6,586,849,700 -1.74 
8 -55,836,226,496 7.28 -71,064,472,216 6.01 -78,756,284,310 8.58 -79,669,978,356 8.01 -17,199,472,216 4.54 
9 -47,285,045,980 6.17 -62,618,577,760 5.29 -87,001,383,234 9.48 -88,099,486,528 8.86 -28,418,773,120 7.51 
10 -224,621,452,016 29.29 -235,578,895,616 19.92 -300,125,152,760 32.70 -301,007,482,144 30.27 -267,791,958,140 70.74 
Total -766,907,892,764 100.00 -1,182,896,965,200 100.00 -917,901,070,353 100.00 -994,375,037,097 100.00 -378,572,316,868 100.00 
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Table 25. Dynamic Behavior Microsimulation Scenarios I and III, Number of Winners and 
Losers 
Income Winners Losers 
Group     
1 0 655594 
2 111,987  
3 53,899  
4 26878  
5 23770  
6 11934  
7 9,476  
8 3,591  
9 2,665  
10 2,549  
Total 246,749 655,594 
 
Table 26. Dynamic Behavior Microsimulation Scenario V, Number of Winners and Losers 
Income Winners Losers 
Group     
1 655,594  
2 105,810 6,177 
3 10,406 43,493 
4  26,878 
5  23,770 
6  11,934 
7 2,848 6,628 
8 3,591  
9 2,665  
10 2,549  
Total 783,463 118,880 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 
In this dissertation we explored the impact of the change in individual income tax law 
on laborers and employees. We analyzed the income behavioral responses of taxpayers across 
different income groups, estimated the distribution of income tax burden, and calculated the 
amount of income tax liability under current and proposed laws.  
Theoretically, we used an applicable labor/leisure choice model to explore the labor 
supply elasticities and reporting income elasticities. We developed a general labor/leisure 
choice model with the imposition of a progressive income tax into the budget constraint. The 
general labor/leisure choice model was adapted from the labor choice model frameworks 
developed in Varian 1982, Slemrod 2001, and Nicholson 2002. As an additional appeal to our 
theoretical framework, we also summarized a tax avoidance model by Alm and Wallace 
2007a.  
The empirical results for behavioral response suggest that taxpayers who experienced 
larger reductions in their marginal tax rate after the tax reform in 2000 reported more of their 
income relative to taxpayers who were least affected. Based on the household survey 
(Susenas) data for 1999 through 2004, the labor supply elasticity results suggest that an 
increase in marginal tax rate reduced the number of hours worked by laborers and employees. 
The reporting income elasticities results show that taxpayers in the highest-income groups are 
more responsive to changes in the marginal tax rate. These results are comparable to reporting 
income elasticity results in previous literature. Our labor supply elasticities from the 
household survey data ranged from -0.05 to -1.05, while our reporting income elasticities 
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from the taxpayers dataset ranged from 0.4 to -1.77. The reporting income elasticities are 
relatively larger than the labor supply elasticities. Recall that the reporting income data are 
collected from the Indonesian taxpayer’s office. The reporting decision of taxpayers is a 
bigger decision than the labor supply decision, since laborers and employees do not have 
much control over their number of hours worked.  
The microsimulation results suggest that using a static microsimulation yields smaller 
government income tax collection losses as compared to a dynamic behavior microsimulation. 
Under scenarios I and III, where there are no changes in the personal exemptions rate, the 
government income tax collection loss was smaller as compared to scenarios II and IV, where 
the personal exemptions rate increased by three times and 20 percent of the current rate, 
respectively.  
The microsimulation results imply that, under a progressive income tax schedule, a 
small increase in personal exemptions without any significant changes in the marginal tax rate 
does not ease the income tax burden for lower-income groups. The income tax liabilities 
results show that, under a proposed flat rate scenario, government income tax revenue is 
higher than under other proposed scenarios with a progressive marginal tax rate but the 
income tax burden under this scenario would be highly unequal, where most of the income tax 
burden would be borne by the lower-middle income groups.  
The overall empirical results could be translated into policy recommendations for the 
central government and tax authorities for future income tax reform, improving the individual 
income tax system in Indonesia. Our primary contribution to the empirical literature on 
individual income tax is the estimation of a combination between labor supply elasticity and 
reporting income elasticity for the dynamic income behavior microsimulation. Our second 
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contribution is a newly utilized microsimulation model that includes static and dynamic 
income behavior microsimulation. The microsimulation tax calculator gives us results for the 
income tax liabilities under current and proposed laws, the income tax burden across income 
groups under current and proposed laws, and the tax difference (or number of winners and 
losers) in each scenario.  
Our empirical results have some implications for policy makers in Indonesia. Based on 
the behavioral response analyses, we argue that high-income taxpayers are more responsive to 
the change in their marginal tax rate, thus any changes on the income tax rate should consider 
the fact that changing the rate for high-income taxpayers would make more changes in 
reporting decisions and in labor supply decisions. From an equity point of view, the new 
scenario should ease the burden on the lowest-income group.  
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APPENDIX A 
INCOME TAX IN INDONESIA 
 
Table A1. Government Revenue 2001−2006, by Type of Tax 
Tax Year 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Income Tax 71,359.55 84,469.47 96,051.41 
111,957.2
1 
140,394.1
3 
165,643.8
8 
VAT 55,857.25 65,243.73 76,760.78 87,567.31 
101,295.1
6 
123,032.5
7 
Property Tax 6,663.91 7,985.77 10,906.12 14,680.02 19,613.78 23,895.55 
Others 1,591.48 1,468.88 1,654.60 1,832.33 2,050.25 2,287.38 
Total 
135,472.1
9 
159,167.8
5 
185,372.9
1 
216,036.8
8 
263,353.3
1 
314,859.3
8 
Source: Directorate General of Taxation (DGT), 2007 
Note: $1=IDR 9,000. All in billion rupiah. 
 
Table A2. Income Tax Revenue by Type of Source, 2006 
Type Income Tax Revenue Share of Revenue 
  
(in million Rupiah) (%) 
Article 21 31,594,963.38 ($3,510.55) 18.47 
Article 22 4,044,272.26 2.36 
Article 22 import 13,141,300.19 7.68 
Article 23 15,413,008.30 9.01 
Article 25/29 individual 1,815,310.53 1.06 
Article 25/29 corporate 70,252,728.57 41.07 
Article 26 10,619,311.07 6.21 
Final and  Fiscal 24,135,219.04 14.11 
Others 42,352.57 0.02 
Total Income Tax 171,058,465.91($19,006.5) 100.00 
Source: Directorate General of Taxation (DGT), 2007 
Note: $1 = IDR 9,000 
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Table A3. Articles on Income Tax Law 
Articles Object 
Article 21 Withholding income 
Article 22 Corporate income tax 
Article 22 import Income tax from imported goods and services 
Article 23 Dividend, rent, royalty 
Article 25/29 (individual 
and corporate) 
Real Income of individual/corporate at the end of tax year 
based on the amount of tax owed last year 
Article 26 Income tax for expatriate either individual or corporate from 
income sources in Indonesia such as interest, dividend, 
royalty, rent, etc. 
Final and Fiscal Any income sources that are already taxed at the final stage, 
no need to report this under the individual income tax form. 
Fiscal is any tax that taxpayer pay when leaving the country 
 
Table A4. Personal Exemptions 1983−2006, by Marital Status 
Status Year 
  1983−1991 1991−2000 2000−2004 2005 2006−2008 
Single 960($106.67) 1,728($192) 2,880($320) 12,000($1,333.33) 13,200* 
Additional Married  480($53.33) 864($96) 1,440($160) 1,200($133.33) 1,200 
Add Married Woman  960($106.67) 1,728($192) 2,880($320) 12,000($1,333.33) 13,200 
Additional Dependent  480($53.33) 864($96) 1,440($160) 1,200($133.33) 1,200 
Source: Directorate General of Taxation (DGT), 2007 
Note: $1=IDR 9,000. All in thousand rupiahs, number of dependents maximum three.  
*IDR 13,200,000=$1,466.67 
 
 
 
Table A5. Total Individual and Corporate Income Tax Identification, by Year 
Year  Individual 
Income Tax ID  
Corporate Tax ID  Total  
2000 1,320,157 660,736 1,980,893 
2001 1,690,193 795,361 2,485,554 
2002 2,020,334 879,375 2,899,709 
2003 2,327,618 966,802 3,294,420 
2004 2,622,184 1,047,876 3,670,060 
Source: Directorate General of Taxation (DGP), 2007 
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Object of Individual Income Tax under Law No. 17/2000: 
 
- Wages, salary, commissions, bonuses, allowance, pensions, gratuities 
- Honoraria, lottery prizes, awards 
- Insurance premiums 
- Profits from business 
- Interest 
- Dividends 
- Royalties 
- Rents from property 
- Annuities received or accrued 
- Gains from cancellation of debts 
- Gains from sale or transfer of property 
- Gains from the difference in exchange rate 
- Refunds of tax payments already deducted as cost 
- Any source of income that increases net of wealth and has not been taxed 
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APPENDIX B 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
In this appendix, we present the derivation of the theoretical model we developed 
earlier in chapter III. The maximization problem in the theoretical model (3.1) is derived as 
follows: 
 
 
Subject to: 
 
 
Where Y is the total reported income, W is wage income, L is leisure, and Z is non-wage 
income, or unearned income. The total time constraint is 1=N+L, where N is the total amount 
spent working, or the labor supply.  
After imposing a progressive income tax into the budget constraint: 
 
 
 
Substitute budget constraint into the utility function to get: 
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The next step is to maximize equation (B.3); the first order condition gives the 
information on the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and income: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and income in equation (B.4) 
shows the amount of income which the taxpayer is willing to exchange for leisure time, is 
equal to the amount of wage after tax. We also obtain the first order condition from the 
implicit function of F ( . 
Use implicit function: 
 
 
 
From the labor/leisure choice model, we expect to get the leisure demand function 
and labor supply function. By implicit function theorem, we implicitly define the leisure 
demand and labor supply: 
 
L* = L (W (1-ti), Z) 
N* = 1 - L*= 1 - L (W (1-ti), Z) 
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The comparative static properties: 
 
 
 
Note that  can be positive, negative, or zero, depending on whether the type of goods is 
normal, neutral, or inferior. At least one of these goods, either Y or L, must be normal.  
 
 
                                                                                                   (B.6)                                   
 
Use comparative statics in equation (B.5) to derive the Slutsky equation; find  
and . To derive the second order condition, recall the 
implicit function equation from (B.3): 
 
 
 
From equation (B.5) we can get: 
 
  
 
93
 
The  holding constant the utility U=U0 yield the Slutsky equation for 
leisure demand: 
 
 
 
The labor supply implies N*=1-L*, thus , thus: 
 
 
 
The  holding constant the utility U=U0 yield the Slutsky equation 
for labor supply: 
 
 
 
Following Slemrod (2001), the effect of tax on labor supply yields: 
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APPENDIX C  
DATA SOURCE, SUMMARY STATISTICS, AND RESULTS 
 
Table C1. Summary Statistics of 1998−2006 Income Tax Returns Data in Real Terms 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 5580771 2003.511 1.803007 1998 2006 
Married 5580771 0.583034 0.4930572 0 1 
Dependent 5580771 0.9992297 1.152557 0 3 
Rgrossinc 5580771 3.16E+07 2.35E+09 2086359 5.52E+12 
Rnetincy 5580771 2.93E+07 1.35E+08 2072012 7.13E+10 
Rnontaxinc 5580771 5428897 2674244 2071943 1.81E+07 
Rtaxinc 5580771 2.39E+07 1.35E+08 15.72327 7.13E+10 
MTR 5580771 7.679886 5.877055 5 35 
Rinctaxl 5580771 4175501 4.27E+07 0.7861635 2.49E+10 
Source: Directorate General of Taxation (DGT), 2007 
 
Table C2. Definition of Variables 
Variable  Variable Definition 
Year Year of income tax return  
Married marital status: married=1, not married=0 
Dependent number of dependents (max=3) 
Grossinc annual gross income (IDR) 
netincy yearly net income (IDR) 
nontaxinc Non-taxable income (tax exemption) (IDR) 
taxinc taxable income (netincy - nontaxinc) (IDR) 
inctaxb 
income tax bracket: <=2000: 10%,15%,30% ; 
>=2001:5%,10%,15%,25%,35% 
inctaxl income tax liability (taxinc * MTR) (IDR) 
Source: DGT, 2007 
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Table C3. Taxable Income Groups for Microsimulation 
Income Group Taxable Income  
1 <=IDR 12,500,000 ($1,389) 
2 >IDR 12,500,000 <=IDR 25,000,000 ($2,778) 
3 >IDR  25,000,000 <=IDR 37,500,000($4,167) 
4 >IDR 37,500,000<=IDR 50,000,000($5,556) 
5 >IDR 50,000,000<=IDR 75,000,000($8,333) 
6 >IDR 75,000,000<=IDR 100,000,000($11,111) 
7 >IDR 100,000,000<=IDR 150,000,000($16,667) 
8 >IDR 150,000,000<=IDR 200,000,000($22,222) 
9 >IDR 200,000,000<=IDR 300,000,000(33,333) 
10 >IDR 300,000,000(33,333) 
 
 
 
Table C4. Number of Winners and Losers, by Income Group (Scenarios I and III) 
Income Group Winners Losers 
1 547,298 108,296 
2 109,208 2,779 
3 53,899  
4 26,878  
5 23,770  
6 11,934  
7 9,476  
8 3,591  
9 2,665  
10 2,549  
Total Observations 791,268 111,075 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
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Table C5. Number of Winners, by Income Group (Scenarios II and IV) 
Income Group  Winners 
1 655,594 
2 111,987 
3 53,899 
4 26,878 
5 23,770 
6 11,934 
7 9,476 
8 3,591 
9 2,665 
10 2,549 
Total Observations 902,343 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
 
Table C6. Number of Winners and Losers, by Income Group (Scenario V, Flat Income Tax 
Rate) 
Income Group Winners Losers 
1 655,594 108,296 
2 96,913 15,074 
3 6,247 47,652 
4  26,878 
5  23,770 
6  11,934 
7 895 8,581 
8 3,591  
9 2,665  
10 2,549  
Total Observations 768,454 242,185 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
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Table C7. Income Tax Burden for Static Microsimulation, by Scenario and Income Group 
Income Base Scenario Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V 
Group Sum PctSum Sum PctSum Sum PctSum Sum PctSum Sum PctSum Sum PctSum 
  
  (%)   (%)   (%)   (%)   (%)   (%) 
1 8,999 33.26 8,999 43.18 0 0 8,999 44.45 5,500 34.18 0 0.00 
 
2 4,364 16.13 3,616 17.35 391 6.94 3,616 17.86 3,266 20.30 1,957 10.28 
 
3 3,325 12.29 2,026 9.72 884 15.68 2,026 10.01 1,912 11.88 4,420 23.22 
 
4 2,201 8.14 1,083 5.20 644 11.42 1,083 5.35 1,039 6.46 3,222 16.93 
 
5 2,514 9.29 1,340 6.43 738 13.09 1,340 6.62 1,255 7.80 3,569 18.75 
 
6 1,708 6.31 971 4.66 642 11.39 971 4.80 938 5.83 2,095 11.01 
 
7 1,674 6.19 1,061 5.09 777 13.78 930 4.59 910 5.66 1,834 9.64 
 
8 808 2.99 544 2.61 457 8.11 405 2.00 400 2.49 752 3.95 
 
9 687 2.54 512 2.46 448 7.95 350 1.73 346 2.15 586 3.08 
 
10 773 2.86 688 3.30 656 11.64 527 2.60 525 3.26 599 3.15 
 
Total 27,053 100 20,839 100 5,637 100 20,246 100 16,090 100 19,032 100 
Source: Author's own calculations 
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Table C8. Sum of Income Tax Liabilities Static Microsimulation, by Scenario and Income Group 
Income Base Scenario Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V 
Group (Rupiah) (Rupiah) (Rupiah) (Rupiah) (Rupiah) (Rupiah) 
1 134,001,139,628 134,001,139,652 0 134,001,139,652 88,617,518,080 0 
 
2 121,800,576,458 99,255,792,051 
 
11,912,803,121 99,255,792,051 89,846,884,155 59,564,015,610 
 
3 135,998,556,580 82,224,658,274 
 
36,180,990,973 82,224,658,274 77,620,293,177 180,904,954,870 
 
4 117,963,406,663 57,883,290,248 34,522,539,488 57,883,290,248 55,547,215,997 172,612,697,397 
 
5 181,027,961,028 96,887,541,567 53,037,015,222 96,887,541,567 90,876,423,484 255,342,903,849 
 
6 167,264,911,746 95,084,250,845 63,120,031,186 95,084,250,845 91,887,826,579 204,650,051,949 
 
7 221,084,367,448 140,669,947,654 103,360,797,008 122,305,968,580 119,768,862,310 240,524,866,026 
 
8 149,046,370,900 100,424,732,280 84,449,483,950 74,618,839,382 73,660,325,044 138,314,483,950 
 
9 173,594,508,740 130,012,188,124 114,155,181,476 89,085,836,586 88,024,999,536 147,641,345,992 
 
10 571,355,070,208 529,669,766,904 514,110,277,288 425,496,183,480 424,218,250,320 430,946,625,240 
 
Total 1,973,136,869,398 1,466,113,307,598 1,014,849,119,711 1,276,843,500,664 1,200,068,598,681 1,830,501,944,883 
Source: Author's own calculations 
 $1=IDR 9,000 
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Table C9. Percentage Sum of Income Tax Liabilities Static Microsimulation, by Scenario and Income Group 
Income Base Scenario Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V 
Group (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1 6.79 9.14 0 10.49 7.38 0 
 
2 6.17 6.77 1.17 7.77 7.49 3.25 
 
3 6.89 5.61 3.57 6.44 6.47 9.88 
 
4 5.98 3.95 3.40 4.53 4.63 9.43 
 
5 9.17 6.61 5.23 7.59 7.57 13.95 
 
6 8.48 6.49 6.22 7.45 7.66 11.18 
 
7 11.20 9.59 10.18 9.58 9.98 13.14 
 
8 7.55 6.85 8.32 5.84 6.14 7.56 
 
9 8.80 8.87 11.25 6.98 7.33 8.07 
 
10 28.96 36.13 50.66 33.32 35.35 23.54 
 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Author's own calculations     
 
 
 100 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Allingham, Michael G., and Agnar Sandmo. 1972. Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. 
Journal of Public Economics 1: 323-338. 
 
Alm, James 1996. What is an "optimal" tax system? National Tax Journal 49, no. 1: 117-33. 
 
Alm, James, and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. 2001. Societal institutions and tax evasion in 
developing and transitional countries. In Public Finance in Developing and 
Transitional Countries: A Conference in Honor of Richard Bird. Atlanta, Georgia: 
International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University. 
 
Alm, James, and Sally Wallace. 2000. Are the rich different? In Does atlas shrug? ed. Joel. B. 
Slemrod:165-192. Harvard University Press. 
 
________. 2004. Can developing countries impose an individual income tax? International 
Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 
Atlanta. 
 
________. 2007. Are Jamaica's direct taxes on labor "fair"? Public Finance Review, no. 
2007;35;83. 
 
________. 2007a. Which elasticity? Estimating the responsiveness of taxpayer reporting 
decisions. International Advances in Economic Research 13, no. 3, no. August 2007: 
255-267. 
 
Andreassen, Leif, and Inger Texmon. 2000. Using dynamic microsimulation models for 
policy analysis and research. In Microsimulation in government policy and 
forecasting, ed. Vishnu Kapur Anil Gupta:265-294. North-Holland: Elsevier. 
 
Boadway, Robin, and David Wildasin. 1984. Public sector economics. Boston: Boston: Little, 
Brown. 
 
Bruce, Neil. 1998. Public finance and the American economy: Addison-Wesley Educational 
Publishers. 
 
Chakraborty, Biman. 2001. On multivariate quantile regression. Journal of Statistical 
Planning and Inference vol 110: pp 109-132. 
 
Directorate General of Taxation. 2007. Petunjuk pengisian spt tahunan pph wajib pajak orang 
pribadi yang tidak melakukan kegiatan usaha/pekerjaan bebas (formulir 1770s): 
Directorate General of Taxation. 
 
  
 
101
Eissa, Nada. 1995. Taxation and labor supply of married women: The tax reform act of 1986 
as a natural experiment. National Bureau of Economic Research, no. W5023. 
 
Feldstein, Martin. 1995. The effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income: A panel study of 
the 1986 tax reform act. The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 103, no. No.3: pp. 
551-572. 
 
Giertz, Seth H. 2004. Recent literature on taxable-income elasticities. Technical Paper Series, 
Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC. 
 
Goel, Rajeev K. and Rati Ram. 2004. Quantile regression estimates of cigarette demand 
elasticities for the United States. Journal of Economics and Finance volume 28, no. 
issue number 3. 
 
Goolsbee, Austan. 2000. What happens when you tax the rich? Evidence from executive 
compensation. Jounal of Political Economics Volume 108, no. No. 2: 352-378. 
 
________. 2000a. It's not about the money: Why natural experiments don't work on the rich. 
In Does atlas shrug?, ed. Joel B. Slemrod:141-164: Harvard University Press. 
 
Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Klara Sabirianova Peter. 2008. Myth 
and reality of flat tax reform: Micro estimates of tax evasion response and welfare 
effects in Russia. National Bureau of Economic Research, no. W 13719 
 
Granell-Perez, Rafael, Amadeo Fuenmayor-Fernandez, and Fransisco J. Higon-Tamarit. 2006. 
The Spanish income tax: Microsimulation of regional government policies. In 8th 
Nordic Seminar on Microsimulation Models. Oslo: Department of Economics, 
Universidad de Valencia. 
 
Gruber, Jon and Emmanuel Saez. 2000. The elasticity of taxable income: Evidence and 
implications. National Bureau of Economic Research, no. W7512. 
 
Haig, Robert M. (1921). The concept of income—economic and legal aspects. The Federal 
Income Tax. New York: Columbia University Press. 1–28. 
 
Hansson, Asa. 2004. Taxpayers responsiveness to tax rate changes and implications for the 
cost of taxation: Lund University, Department of Economics. 
 
Harding, Ann. 2000. Dynamic microsimulation: Recent trends and future prospects. In 
Microsimulation in government policy and forecasting, ed. Vishnu Kapur Anil 
Gupta:297-312. North-Holland: Elsevier. 
 
Holmlund, Bertil, and Martin Soderstrom. 2007. Estimating income responses to tax changes: 
A dynamic panel data approach. IZA Discussion Paper, Bonn. 
 
Johnson, Edgar K. Browning, and William R. 1979. The distribution of the tax burden: 
  
 
102
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
 
Keen, Michael, Harry Papapanagos, and Anthony Shorrocks. 2000. Tax reform and 
progressivity. The Economic Journal 110, no. 460: 50-68. 
 
Koenker, Roger, and Gilbert Bassett, Jr. 1978. Regression quantiles. Econometrica vol. 46, 
no. no. 1: pp. 33-50. 
 
Koenker, Roger, and Kevin F. Hallock. 2001. Quantile regression. Jounal of Economic 
Perspectives volume 15, no. issue number 4: pages 143-156. 
 
Kopczuk, Wojciech. 2004. Tax bases, tax rates and the elasticity of reported income. Journal 
of Public Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Lindsey, Lawrence B. 1987. Individual taxpayer response to tax cuts: 1982-1984. National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Long, James E. 1999. The impact of marginal tax rates on taxable income: Evidence from 
state income tax differentials. Southern Economic Journal vol. 65: 855-869. 
 
Macrae, C. Duncan, and Anthony M. J. Yezer. 1976. The personal income tax and family 
labor supply. Southern Economic Journal 43, no. 1: 783-792. 
 
Mansury Ph.D, R. 1992. The Indonesian income tax: A case study in tax reform of a 
developing country. Singapore: Asian-Pacific Tax and Investment Research Centre. 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, Mark Rider, Riatu Qibthiyyah, and Sally Wallace. 2007. Who bears 
the burden on taxes on labor income in Russia? Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies Research Paper Series No. 07-25. Atlanta. 
 
McNab, Robert, and Sally Wallace. 2000. Microsimulation analysis in support of tax 
administration. In Methods and modelling tools in tax administration, ed. Jorge 
Martinez Dmitry Chernick. Moscow: Unity Publishing. 
 
Ministry of finance and Directorate General of Taxation. 1983. Undang-undang pajak 
penghasilan no.7 tahun 1983, ed. Ministry of Finance, 7/1983: Directorate General of 
Taxation. 
 
________. 1994. Undang-undang pajak penghasilan no.10 tahun 1994, ed. Ministry of 
Finance, 10/1994: Directorate General of Taxation. 
 
________. 2000. Undang-undang pajak penghasilan no.17 tahun 2000, ed. Ministry of 
Finance, 17/2000: Directorate General of Taxation. 
 
Moffitt, Robert A.. 1979. A note on the effect of taxes and transfers on labor supply. Southern 
Economic Journal 45, no. 4: 1266-1273. 
  
 
103
 
Moffitt, Robert A., and Mark O. Wilhelm. 2000. Taxation and the labor supply decisions of 
the affluent. In Does atlas shrug? ed. Joel B. Slemrod:194-239: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Moyes, Patrick, and Anthony Shorrocks. 1998. The impossibility of a progressive tax 
structure. Journal of Public Economics 69, no. 1: 49-65. 
 
Musgrave, Richard A., and Peggy B. Musgrave. 1973. Public finance in theory and practice: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
 
Naylor, Ronald K. 2000. Statistics on individual taxation: The individual taxation statistics 
program of revenue Canada. In Microsimulation in government policy and 
forecasting, ed. Vishnu Kapur Anil Gupta:509-520. North Holland: Elsevier. 
 
Nicholson, Walter. 2002. Microeconomic theory, basic principles and extensions: Thomson 
Learning Inc. 
 
Okner, Joseph A. Pechman, and Benjamin A. 1974. Who bears the tax burden?: The 
Brookings Institution. 
 
Rochjadi, Ahmad, and Jane H. Leuthold. 1994. The effect of taxation on labor supply in a 
developing country: Evidence from cross-sectional data. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 42, no. 2. 
 
Rosen, Harvey S. 2002. Public finance: McGraw Hill. 
 
Rusjdi, Muhammad. 2006. Pph pajak penghasilan. Jakarta: PT INDEKS kelompok 
Gramedia. 
 
Sabirianova Peter, Klara. 2008. Income tax flattening: Does it help to reduce the shadow 
economy?: SSRN. 
 
Saez, Emmanuel. 2000. Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates. National Bureau 
of Economic Research, no. W7628. 
 
________. 2004. Reported incomes and marginal tax rates, 1960-2000: Evidence and policy 
implications. National Bureau of Economic Research W 10273. 
 
Sidik, Machfud. 2007. A new perspective of intergovernmental fiscal relations: Lessons from 
Indonesia's experience: Ripelge, Jakarta. 
 
Simons, Henry. 1938. Personal income taxation: The definition of income as a problem of 
fiscal policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 49. 
 
Slemrod, Joel B. 2001. A general model of the behavioral response to taxation. International 
  
 
104
Tax and Public Finance 8, no. 2: 119-128. 
 
Stark, Oded, J., Edward Taylor, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1986. Remittances and inequality. The 
Economic Journal 96, no. 383: 722-740. 
 
Stepankova, Petra. 2002. Using microsimulation models for assessing the redistribution 
function of a tax-benefit system. Finance a Uver vol. 52, no. No.1: 36-50. 
 
Syamsulhakim, Ekki. 2002. The effect of the implementation of the new regulation on 
personal income taxation in Indonesia (the law number 17/2000) on the behavior of 
personal income tax and Islamic income tithe (zakat mal) payer. Working Paper. 
 
The Indonesian Directorate General of Tax. 2007. Indonesia tax in brief: Directorate General 
of Tax. 
 
Thoersen, Thor O., and Karl Ove Aarbu. 1999. Income responses to tax changes-evidence 
from the Norwegian tax reform. In 55th Congress of the International Institute of 
Public Finance, September. Moscow: Statistics Norway, Research Department. 
 
Thomas, Alastair. 2007. Taxable income elasticities and the deadweight cost of taxation in 
New Zealand: Inland Revenue Department, New Zealand. 
 
Tresch, Richard W. 2002. Public finance, a normative theory: Academic Press, Elsevier 
Science USA. 
 
Triest, Robert K. 1990. The effect of income taxation on labor supply in the United States. 
Journal of Human Resources Summer 1990, no. 25: 491-516. 
 
Turabian, Kate L. 1996. A manual for writers of term papers, theses, and dissertation: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Varian, Hal R. 1992. Microeconomic analysis: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
 
Vecernik, Jiri, and Petra Stepankova. 2002. Redistribution of income through taxes and 
benefits in the Czech Republic between 1989 and 2000 and beyond: Observation and 
simulation. In General Conference of The International Association for Research in 
Income and Wealth. Stockholm, Sweden. 
 
Wallace, Sally and James Alm. 2004. The Jamaican individual income tax. Atlanta: Andrew 
Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometrics analysis of cross-section and panel data: The 
MIT Press. 
 
________. 2003. Introductory econometrics, a modern approach: Thomson Southwestern. 
 105 
 
VITA 
 
Thalyta Yuwono was born in Surabaya, Indonesia. She earned a Bachelor degree in 
Economics from Airlangga University in 2001. She received a Master degree in Economics 
from Georgia State University in 2003, which was funded by the USAID. In 2003, she 
continued her study at Georgia State University and earned a doctoral degree in Economics in 
December, 2008. Thalyta’s dissertation was about individual income tax in Indonesia, where 
she analyzed the behavioral response of taxpayers and the distribution of income tax burden. 
Thalyta’s research interest is public finance. After she finished her study, Thalyta returned to 
Indonesia. 
 
 
